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ABSTRACT
Capitalism and Violence: A Test and Critique
of the Alienation Proposition

by

Roger Roots
Dr. Frederick W. Preston, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Sociology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

The belief that primitive societies are more harmonious than modem ones is
“deeply engrained in scholarly discourse” (Edgerton 1992, 2). Durkheim, Weber, and
Marx all believed in the notion (Edgerton 1992, 3). Since at least the nineteenth
century, social scientists have proposed that capitalism and industrialism represent
artificial phenomena, alien to human nature, and that the growth and spread of
capitalism in recent generations has spawned an increasing degree o f angst, frustration,
conflict, and stress on human societies. This concept, known as alienation, has been
especially popular among sociologists o f Marxist orientation who perceive human
misery to be a product o f the mayhem and competition of modem capitalism (Derber,
Chasin). In this dissertation, the author critiques and analyzes the alienation proposition
by delving into its history and comparing it to the recent findings o f archaeology,
history, and anthropology. The author tests the proposition by comparing contemporary

111

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

homicide rates registered by modem nation-states with measurements o f market
freedom in those same nation-states.
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CHAPTER 1

A TROUBLESOME WORD
“Capitalism” has been the subject o f so much discussion in Western discourse
that it should lend itself to easy definition. Yet rival theoretical camps within the social
sciences attribute different meanings to the term (Laga 2004). Competing conceptions
of capitalism are central elements o f a number o f grand sociological theories. It seems
to say something about capitalism itself that its invocation in language provokes such
disagreement. To use the term is to give voice to one perspective o f human economic
history at the expense of others (Phillips 2001, 56). Most importantly, users o f the term
capitalism have profoundly different answers to the ultimate question o f whether it
signifies human economic nature or an imposition upon human nature. And, ultimately,
these rival interpretations determine whether its users view capitalism as a
manifestation o f economic freedom or economic slavery (compare Blyth (2004) and
Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004)).
Early works about capitalism, like Adam Smith’s Wealth o f Nations (1776) did
not attach such moral significance to the concept. In fact, the term was not widely used
until the nineteenth century (Wrong 2004, 26), and it was not until the twentieth century
“that it fully burst upon political debate” -and then largely in a peijorative sense
(Braudel 1982, 237).' The publication o f two major theoretical works, Karl Marx’s
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Capital (1894) and Max W eber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism
(1905) can be blamed for producing the wealth o f conceptual power that we now
attribute to the word. Both works invited readers to look beyond the appearances o f
existing economic structures and into their historical and social development. Each
invested hundreds o f pages into constructing a meaning o f capitalism consistent with
the theories o f its author. The word never afterward lent itself to simplistic definition.
Although Weber and Marx differed markedly over many things, their depiction
o f capitalism as an artificial creation rather than a natural oeeurrence became accepted
as sociological law by the 1930s. Weber and Marx looked hard for, and consequently
found, “p ro o f’ of capitalism’s uniqueness. They conceded the ubiquity o f markets o f
goods in antiquity and across all organized societies but insisted that there were
important distinctions between these markets and capitalism. They defined their
versions of capitalism with such precision that only their specialized realm of
concentration (Europe in the late middle ages to the industrial era) qualified as having
it.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism (1930), Weber laid out an
elaborate interpretation of modem western economic history that painted contemporary
capitalism as the unique product o f specific phenomena in medieval and renaissance
Europe. “Only in the Occident,” wrote Weber in the memorable introduction, do
economic circumstances gel into authentic capitalism.
It was rationalism— the calm, systematic, machinelike gathering o f profits from
industry and commerce—that, for Weber, was the keystone. True capitalism, according
to Weber, was “the pursuit o f profit, and forever renewed profit (Weber 1983, 24).
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“Where capitalistic acquisition is rationally pursued, calculation underlies every single
action of the [commercial] partners” (p. 24). Weber argued that modem westem society
(“the Occident”) “has developed capitalism both to a quantitative extent and in types,
forms and directions which have never existed elsewhere’’" (p. 25, emphasis added).
“ [A]ll characteristic legal institutions o f modem capitalism,” wrote Weber from
corporations, to negotiable securities, to bills o f exchange, to stock certificates, to
mortgages, to deeds o f tmst were inventions o f modem Europe (26, 118). Weber
believed there were no factories prior to the Middle Ages, only slave-labor operations
directed by state officials (1983, 44).
Marxist and Weberian theorists suggested that the definition o f capitalism can
require as many as a half-dozen specific elements (Wrong 2004). Weber him self
defined capitalism as a system in which 1) the appropriation of means o f production are
in private hands 2) there are free markets, 3) there is mechanization o f production, 4)
predictable law goveming business affairs, 5) free labor, and 6) a ’’commercialization of
economic life”—meaning a robust culture o f commercial (i.e., banking and financing)
instmments (Weber 1999, 44). “While capitalism o f various forms is met with in all
periods of history,” wrote Weber, “the stmcturing o f social life around capitalistic
methods is characteristic o f the Occident alone and even here has been the inevitable
method only since the middle o f the nineteenth century” (Weber 1999, 43-44).
Weber distinguished this natural tendency toward profitable market exchange from
capitalism as follows:
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The impulse to acquisition, pursuit o f gain, o f money, o f the greatest
possible amount o f money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism.
This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians,
coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles,
crusaders, gamblers and beggars. One may say that it has been
common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all
countries o f the world, wherever the objective possibility o f it has been
g iven... Unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with
capitalism, and is still less its spirit (Weber 1983, 24).

This view o f eapitalism as a new, artifieial, westem invention has prevailed in
sociology for a century. Gordon Marshall’s Oxford Dictionary o f Sociology (1998, 53),
for example, contains an eight-paragraph definition, beginning with “a system o f wagelabour and commodity production for sale, exchange, and profit, rather than for
immediate need o f the producers.”
Yet rival, less complieated views o f the concept have endured since the days o f
Adam Smith (Wrong 2004). Smith thought that laissez-fare economics were most
consistent with man’s propensity to “track, barter and exehange” (1776, 13). “Every
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant,” wrote Smith,
“and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society” (Smith 1776,
29). Smith found that societies funetion most smoothly when the “invisible hand” is
unfettered and free to distribute goods and services in accordance with private demand.^
Thomas Sowell, an economist o f the neo-liberal tradition, echoed Smith’s view: “Since
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capitalism was named by its enemies, it is perhaps not surprising that the name is
completely misleading,” wrote Sowell (1995, 207). “Ultimately it is nothing more and
nothing less than an economy not run by political authorities” (207).
Sowell’s seemingly simple definition is loaded with unstated assumptions. It
assumes that capitalism is the natural economic state o f humanity and that impositions
by political authorities are artificial insurgents against human nature. Sowell’s
definition also assumes that capitalism is the natural eeonomic system o f all societies.^
Critics o f Adam Smith like economic historian Karl Polanyi, suggested that
primitive nonwestem societies uncorrepted by contact with the West operate on a basis
o f collective economic distribution. Primitive natives, aecording to Polanyi do nothing
at all for personal “gain”; only for “reciprocity” or ritualized “magie.”

Markets,

aceording to this view, “became important only in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries (Silver 1983, 796). Prior to that there were “redistributive empires over long
periods o f time” (Polanyi 1977, 115). “[S]ocial solidarity was accomplished through
the declaration o f ‘equivalencies’ by the state— that is, by pervasive controls over
prices, wages, rent, and interest” (Silver 1983, 827). Market eeonomies were “new
phenomena, never witnessed before” (Silver 1983, 827 quoting Polanyi, liii, 6).
Polanyi’s most widely read book. The Great Transformation, ranks along with Karl
Marx’s Capital, and Max W eber’s The Protestant Ethic as one o f the most eommonly
read and highly regarded works o f economic history. It “borrows haphazardly from
economics, sociology, anthropology, and history” (Blyth 2004, 117).
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Capitalism as a Westem Phenomenon
Marx and Weber defined capitalism in part by marrying it to the
industrial revolution, and consequently placing it only in the modem world, and
primarily in the west."* Even if versions o f free market eeonomies existed in
other cultures— or had existed in pre-industrial Europe—these economic
variations did not gel into the all-encompassing form o f capitalism that came
with the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation. Nor, aceording to
Noam Chomsky (1993), were non western forms o f market eeonomies as cold
and bmtal as the W estem form. Europeans “broke violently into Asian trading
systems that had been relatively peaeeful before their arrival” (Chomsky 1993, 8
(quoting James Tracy)). Other scholars have suggested that no authentic
nonwestem form o f ffee-market capitalism ever really existed, and that where
modem nonwestem ffee-market cultures exist, they had it imposed on them by
westem nations (Rosenau 2003, 3).

Alienation
The questions posed by these rival definitions o f eapitalism are more than academic.
Those who subscribe to the Marxist or Weberian view advocate interventionist
economic policies, while those who view capitalism as humanity’s natural state
generally hold more politically libertarian views. Moreover, those who view capitalism
as an artificial phenomenon suggest that it dismpts something intrinsic to human social
wellbeing. Marx and those who followed him had a word for the human condition that
capitalism generated: alienation. Alienation, according to Marx, occurred when
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workers were separated from control over production and from the fruits o f their labor.
“[B]y selling one’s labor, the laborer becomes a commodity herself, a kind o f product
that is owned and consumed by the owner” (Laga 2004, 2). Alienation was akin to
Durkheim’s anomie, a state o f disharmony and tension with nature brought about by
social (and economic) instability. Marx wrote that capitalism generated “conquest,
enslavement, robbery, murder” among societies that suffered from it (1990, ch. 26).
Thus the history o f capitalism, according to Marx, was “written in the annals of
mankind in letters o f blood and fire” (ch. 26).
For the Smithians and neoliberals, in contrast, “capitalism” represents harmony
with nature, and anomie is more likely to occur when the capitalistic instinct is
suppressed by regulation. Advocates o f both these views have different assessments of
contemporary political economy and the proper role o f public policy. For generations,
policymakers have battled over these concepts, occasionally implementing one
application or another but never resolving social policy in any one direction.
Sigmund Freud, in his Civilization and Its Discontents (1961, 70-71), summed
up the alienation theory o f social conflict as well as any writer:

The communists believe that they have found the path to deliverance
from our evils. According to them, man is wholly good and is welldisposed to his neighbour; but the institution o f private property has
corrupted his nature. The ownership of private wealth gives the
individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbor;
while man who is excluded from possession is bound to rebel in
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hostility against his oppressor. If private property were abolished, all
wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to share in the
enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men.
Since everyone’s needs would be satisfied, no one would have any
reason to regard another his enemy; all would willingly undertake the
work that was necessary (70-71).^

According to M arx’s friend and frequent eo-author Frederick Engels, in his The Origin
o f the Family, Private Property, and the State (1972 [1884]), “[T]he developing money
system penetrated like a corroding acid into the traditional life o f the rural communities
founded on natural economy” (111). And with private ownership o f property,
aceording to Engels, came the inequities o f class structure:

The lowest interests—base greed, brutal sensuality, sordid avarice,
selfish plunder o f common possessions—usher in the new, civilized
society, class society; the most outrageous means—theft, rape, deceit
and treachery—undermine and topple the old, classless, gentile society.
And the new society, during all the 2,500 years o f its existence, has
never been anything but the development o f the small minority at the
expense of the exploited and oppressed great majority; and it is so
today more than ever before (Engels 1972, 101).
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Defining Alienation
In the broadest sense, alienation can be defined as the estrangement o f
individuals from one another, or from a specific situation or process (Marshall 1998).
Many distinct philosophical, sociological, and psychological dimensions are invoked
with the alienation concept, and not all o f them find agreement with each other.
Sociological discussions o f the concept relate most to M arx’s argument that certain
social structures oppress people and deny their essential humanity (Marshall 1998).
“Alienation is an objective condition inherent in the social and economic arrangements
of capitalism” (p. 14).
The concept o f alienation has been discussed and debated extensively since the
nineteenth century. Marx suggested that capitalist production economies alienated
workers by reducing them to the level o f commodities in which their range o f choices
were limited and their relationships with their work and their families and coworkers
became strained (Marx 1944). Others view alienation as essentially a state o f mind (Cox
1998). Defining alienation precisely is not easy “since the term has been used to
describe a wide range of human experiences” (Smith and Preston 1977, 331). In
general, however, the concept is defined as the whole variety o f symptoms o f
estrangement that modem humans face in capitalist eeonomies, including the sense of
meaninglessness, powerlessness, isolation, and normlessness associated with wages and
occupational specialization (Seeman 1959). But while differences in interpretation exist
in contemporary scholarly discourse, the concept of alienation encompasses a broad
understanding as “shorthand for the mood o f distemper, cynicism, and distrust believed
to prevail in contemporary life” (Wrong 1998, 47).
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These various facets o f the same general concept can be operationalized by
means of measurements o f social disharmony and frustration. Measurements such as
rates o f mental illness, rates o f domestic violence, levels o f aggression, or other
measures of violence generally are perhaps the clearest way to assign values to the
concept in the real world. The quantitative analysis employed in this study relies on
homicide rates as its chief means o f operationalizing the concept.

A Tendency to Crisis?
Consistent with their view that capitalism generates alienation and anomie
among societies that have adopted it, the alienationists also propose that capitalism is on
a trajectory toward crisis (Wood 1999, 1). The contemporary alienation model posits
that “ [gjlobalized eapitalism has changed the face of social reproduction worldwide
over the past three decades, enabling intensification of capital accumulation and
exacerbating differences in wealth and poverty” (Katz 2003, 256). The current stage, a
hypercapitalist or critical stage in capitalism, represents, according to Katz, represents a
“demise o f the social contract” (2003, 256). Although capitalism may survive for “a
few centuries yet,” its ultimate overthrow by soeialism is predestined (Marcuse 1978,
178).
The concept o f alienation assumes that people trapped in capitalist societies
exhibit tendencies toward a wide variety o f anti-social disorders. Violence increases
beeause competition for “scarce resourees, property, and territory as well as for self
esteem and self respect encourages greed, envy, jealousy, deeeit, betrayal, and
exploitation” (Rosenau 2003, 47). In the absence of an alternate morality, capitalism

10
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“generates a self-reinforcing spiral o f intensifying competition” (Rosenau 2003, 47).
“Evidence o f the resulting social stress is everywhere,” according to proponents o f the
alienation proposition: “in rising rates o f crime, drug abuse, divorce, teenage suicide,
and domestic violence; growing numbers o f political, economic, and environmental
refugees; and even the changing nature o f organized armed conflict. Violent crime is
increasing at alarming rates all around the world” (Kortner 1995, 30).
Moreover, according to the alienationists, these tensions are increasing
as capitalism is spread through the world by westem hegemony. Fueled by
alienation, commodity fetishism, and greed, westerners set out in the eighteenth
century upon a mission for global domination, according to the Marxists and
Weberians. The ideology they carried with them fueled a brutal imperialism
that conquered all in its path. “Europeans ‘fought to kill,’ and they had the
means to satisfy their blood lust,” according to Chomsky (1993, 8). Imperial
conquest o f other continents was typified by savagery and “all-destmctive fury.”
The European model of mercantilism “relied critically upon the constant use of
force” (Chomsky 1993, 8).

11
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CHAPTER 2

THE LITERATURE
The relationship between economic change and social behavior is a frequently
revisited topic o f sociological research (Catalano and Dooley 1977; Cottrell 1951;
Burgess 1925; Ogbum 1936). The most famous classical study o f this relationship is
Durkheim’s (1897) study of suicide rates in Europe in the early 1890s, which found a
relationship between suicide rates and eeonomic fluctuation. Durkheim’s eeonomic
analysis of social behavior has since been emulated and largely substantiated by more
contemporary sociologists (e.g., Pieree 1967). Pierce found that economic fluctuation,
whether in positive or negative directions, reduces social cohesion and leads to
increased frequency o f suicide. Brenner (1973) also found a relationship between
economic change and deviant behavior, as measured by first admissions to New York
State mental hospitals.
Barbara Chasin, in her book-length study o f the question. Inequality and
Violence in the United States (1997), subtitled Casualties o f Capitalism, attributes rates
of violence solely to economic structure. She suggests that even institutions like the
modem nuclear family are extensions o f the capitalist stmcture o f the west, and
violence tends to follow the money, so to speak. The westem capitalist nations,
according to Chasin, are the chief promoters o f violence in the world, led by their
capitalist flagship, the United States. “Much o f the violence in the United States is

12
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linked to the decisions o f those in the economic and political command posts with
corporate bureaucracies being the most powerful in the United States” (22).
While Chasin’s thesis seems simple at first glance, it soon gains layers o f
complexity as it is analyzed. Chasin attributes the violence o f both the powerless and
the powerful to the same underlying cause: capitalism. Violence by the poor against
the rieh, she said, is caused by the hatreds and jealousies that come with lower
socioeconomic status. Violence by the poor against other poor, likewise, is attributable
to the angst of their powerlessness and their mad competition between each other to rise
through the social structure. Violence by the powerful against the powerless-. Again, the
competition that drives capitalist economic systems. Even violence by the powerful
against the powerful is explained as a product o f jealousy. Thus, violence is the
undergirder o f the the entire modem world order: “a distinct violence o f powerlessness
as well as a violence o f domination” (Gautney 2003, 78).
Few scholars have offered a precise explanation of how capitalism generates
violence. Pauline V. Rosenau, however, has attempted to define the metabological and
psychological stresses that link open markets to social conflict. Competition
“encourages greed, envy, jealousy, deceit, betrayal, and exploitation” and removes
inhibitions o f hostility and aggression (Rosenau 2003, 47). “Rosenau points to links
between stress and hypertention, heart disease, diabetes, depression and reduced
immunity (21). Consequently, health stresses are very high for those at bottom o f social
structure (Rosenu 26).
Boston College sociologist Charles Derber (2002) refers to the violence
generated by America’s market economy as the “Wilding o f America” and attributes the

13
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high homicide rates in the contemporary U. S. to greed and competition over the
“American Dream.” “America now faces a wilding epidemic that is eating at the
country’s social foundation and could rot it,” Derber proclaims:

Wilding includes a vast spectrum o f self-centered and selfaggrandizing behavior that harms others. A wilding epidemic tears at
the social fabric and threatens to unravel society itself, ultimately
reflecting the erosion o f the moral order and the withdrawal o f feelings
and commitments from others to oneself, “number one” (Derber 2002,
8 ).

The only solution, according to Derber, is to erect massive institutions o f social
welfare and wealth redistribution. Like many proponents of the alienation thesis,
Derber sees collective intervention in the economy as an effective means o f stemming
the tide of global violence.
Derber’s thesis travels through his descriptions o f increasing road rage,
workplace rage, school rage, and air rage, corporate corruption, family violence and
even college cheating scandals. “Expressive and instrumental wilding have in common
an anti-social self-centeredness made possible by a stunning collapse o f moral restraints
and a chilling lack o f empathy” (p. 9).
The economic implications o f Derber’s thesis are unmistakable. “Systematic
connections exist,” said Derber, “between American capitalism and wilding” (p. 12).
“The progress o f the wilding epidemic is shaped less by the percentage o f sociopaths in
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the population than by the sociopathy o f elites and the rules o f the success game they
help to define.. . . The wilding epidemic is now seeping into America mainly from the
top” (p. 14);

Our current wilding crisis is rooted politically in the “ffee-market”
revolution that began with President Reagan. As conservative analyst
Kevin Phillips has noted, the Reagan revolution advanced the most
ambitious class agenda o f the rich in more than a century, creating an
innovative brew o f market deregulation and individualistic ideology
that helped fan the flames o f wilding across the land. In the 1990s, a
new Republican congressional majority led by Speaker Newt Gingrich
and the “new Democrats” led by President Clinton launched their own
wilding initiatives and raced against each other to dismantle the social
programs that symbolize our commitment to the poor, to the needy, and
to each other. And in 2001, President George W. Bush, despite his
rhetoric o f compassionate conservatism, promised to complete the
revolution o f greed that Reagan hegan (Derber 2002, 14).

Globalization
During the past decade, much sociological commentary has revolved around
globalization and its effects on the Third World. Those who subscribe to the alienation
thesis have suggested that globalization— the increasing movement o f capital, goods.
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businesses, culture, and people across national borders— has been a bane to the
sociological health o f the world.

Scholars have drawn disparate conclusions, with

some proclaiming lasting benefits to workers in opening Asian markets (Norberg 2003;
Sowell 2004) and others seeing a downturn in the opportunities and lifestyles o f the
world’s poor (Korten 1995; Gautney 2002; Chomsky 2003). The alienation model has
been revived to explain and predict the social features o f the phenomenon. “[W]e see
that the growing violence and the extraction o f wealth from apparently independent
states are an integral component o f contemporary globalization,” wrote Schiller and
Fouron, both die-hard alienation theorists (2003, 237). Robert W. McChesney (1999:8)
claimed that capitalist reforms have brought terrible consequences to the global
community: “a massive increase in social and economic inequality, a marked increase
in severe deprivation for the poorest nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous
global environment, an unstable global economy and an unprecedented bonanza for the
wealthy.”
Noam Chomsky, in Hegemony or Survival (2003) claimed that the growth of
global markets has allowed the most powerful state in world history to maintain its
global domination through military force. Postmodern critical theorist Frederic Jameson
indicated that expanding free markets represent a “new wave o f American military and
economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history,
the underside o f culture is blood, torture, death and horror” (1993, 65). Globalization
“creates intense competition between the more powerful and weaker numbers o f the
crew for a shrinking pool of life-support services,” wrote Korten in his provocative
book When Corporations Rule the World (1995). “Some crew members are deprived of
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a means of basic sustenance, social tensions mount, and the legitimacy o f governance
structures erodes— creating significant potential for social breakdown and violence”
(Korten 1995: 26).
Amy Chua’s recent academic best-seller World on Fire (2004) suggests that
global free markets have tended to benefit insular mercantilist minorities around the
globe: Jews in post-Communist Russia, Indians in East Africa, Tutsis in Rwanda,
Hungarians in Romania, Chinese in southeast Asia, and whites in Latin America and
Zimbabwe— at the expense o f population majorities. A “pigmentocracy” has developed
in Latin America (Chua 2004: 57), typified by dark-skinned poverty and light-skinned
plutocracy (59). This wealth disparity between majorities and minorities, according to
Chua, generates demagoguery and ultimately ethnic violence as a backlash. “Thus
glohalization and free markets in Southeast Asia have generated not only tremendous
growth but also tremendous ethnic hatred and instability” (Chua 2004:47). Neil J.
KresseTs recent book Mass Flate: The Global Rise o f Genocide and Terror (2002) goes
so far as to claim that human brutality erupted and expanded in the twentieth century
with the advancement o f free market global capitalism and “now threatens the very core
o f Western civilization.”
Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2002) offered heart-breaking anecdotes o f horrors
wrought by corporations like Nike, Lévi-Strauss, and Gap. While the virtues of
growing commerce in and among developing countries have been increasingly
recognized by economists (Norberg 2002; Novak 1982), scholars like Klein suggest that
the process is generating a middleman effect whereby the division o f labor is
increasingly squeezing low-end workers out o f their fair share o f the economic pie:
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The only way to understand how rich and supposedly law-abiding
multinational corporations could regress to nineteenth-century levels o f
exploitation (and get caught repeatedly) is through the mechanics o f
subcontracting itself: at every layer of contracting, subcontracting and
homework, the manufacturers bid against each other to drive down the
price, and at every level the contractor and subcontractor exact their
small profit. At the end o f this bid-down, contract-out chain is the
worker— often three or four times removed from the company that
placed the original order—with a paycheck that has been trimmed at
every turn (Klein 2002: 212).

Said differently, the true culprit is efficiency. Growing rationalization of
commerce has confined humanity in the “iron cage” predicted by Weber. Steven
Sampson (2003, 310) stated that globalization enriches some hut turns others “into truly
global proletariats who follow the flow o f capital” from region to region. Gautney
(2003) suggests that the globalization o f capitalism is promoting a “globalization o f
violence,” a world order where violence is supplanting consent. “Violence is the
substance o f the 2U‘-century world order, an order marked hy its close proximity to
pure war” (65).

The role o f force in setting the global distribution o f power creates an
appearance o f a world order increasingly directed toward pure violence.
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in which consent—materialized in elections, in consumptive hahits, in a
general lack o f involvement— emerges as a hollow confirmation o f the
force o f Empire. It is tacit consent as opposed to participation; an anti
democratic politics of order. The overwhelming presence of violence
around the globe— from the threat o f world destruction to police
brutality to the technical supervision (Gautney 2003, 68).

Scholars like Chomsky, Gautney, Kortner and Klein share a common belief that
the violence and anomie allegedly wrought by economic free markets in western
societies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have now been spread
across the globe with the expansion o f global capitalism since the 1980s. Accordingly,
the turn of the twenty-first century has seen “an escalation o f war, preparation for war,
and political repression” (Brecher 2003, 202). Jonathan Friedman, editor of a collection
o f recent essays dealing with the relationship between global neoliberalism and
violence, concludes that the current situation produces “increasing violence o f various
kinds, in which the character o f the violence is increasingly based on processes o f
fragmentation of former political units and on the intensive incorporation o f the new
fragments into regional and global circuits o f control and finance by both state and
nonstate actors” (Friedman 2003, xiv).
Some alienation theorists see the violence attributed to capitalism as a product o f
gap between the haves and have nots that capitalism allegedly creates. Noam Chomsky,
one o f the most visible contemporary proponents o f the alienation model, claims that
“the increasing polarization o f the society that’s heen going on for the past twenty-five
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years, and the marginalization o f large sectors o f the population” is to hlame for an
alleged increase in violent crime (2003b). “[T]he basic ideology [of contemporary
capitalism] is that a person’s human rights depend on what they can get for themselves
in the market system, they have no human value” (2003b; 33). “Larger and larger
sectors o f the population have no form o f organization and no viable, constructive way
o f reacting, so they pursue the available options, which are often violent” (33).

The Alienation Concept in Literature and Folklore
The belief that primitive societies are more harmonious than modem ones is
“deeply engrained in scholarly discourse” (Fdgerton 1992, 2). Durkheim, Weber, and
Marx all believed in this notion (Fdgerton 1992, 3). In fact, the theory predates
sociology. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins o f Inequality suggested
in 1754 that inequality was created by the cormption that followed from modem
society’s adoption o f private property. Rousseau made the man-coirupted-hymodemity paradigm popular throughout Europe for a century (Hocutt 2003).
Looking farther back, one can find the idea of a perfect society cormpted
by selfishness and wickedness in man’s earliest myths. The Bible begins with a
tale o f man’s fall from grace in antiquity, and his banishment from the Garden
o f Eden, where he is exposed to the suffering and stmggle o f hard labor,
jealousy, and interpersonal competition (Rudgley 1999, 1). Immediately
following the Bible’s Book o f Genesis is the story o f Noah and his ark, which
represents a flipside o f this same myth; it provides a vision of man sinking into
sin, wickedness, and selfishness. Noah, a rare pillar o f morality who followed
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God’s instructions, survived God’s wrath against the world by weathering a 40day flood within the safe confines o f a ship that he constructed in strict
compliance with God’s orders (Exodus 1-12). A return to peacefulness and
harmony was experienced briefly with the reestablishment o f communal living,
but the Bible then proceeds, through hundreds o f pages, to recount man’s retreat
into sin and selfishness. This retreat escalates as Jesus is executed, and
culminates in an apocalypse described in the Book o f Revelations. Harmony
returns (for true believers) after the crisis is over. Like M arx’s communist
utopia, this end time shall have no poor in the land (Deut. 15:4, R.V.) and all
people will live in peace and contentment, each under his own grape vine and
fig tree (Matt. 18:6-14). There will be no disinherited and no unfit, and all
people will have equal access to the Tree o f Life (Rev. 21:22).
To some extent this version o f human events was recreated in sociology in the
writings of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who viewed human antiquity as typified by
mechanical solidarity in which individuals acted in concert for the good of the
community. Durkheim contrasted this solidarity with life in “the economic world” of
today in which anomie describes m an’s increasing instability, escalating conflict, and
social unrest, manifesting in high rates o f suicide and homicide (Durkheim 1941, 40):

If, in proportion as societies pass from the lower to the higher types,
the rate o f criminality, i.e., the relation between the yearly number of
crimes and the population, tended to decline, it might be believed that
crime, while still normal, is tending to lose this character o f normality.
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But we have no reason to helieve that such a regression is substantiated.
Many facts would seem rather to indicate a movement in the opposite
direction. From the begirming o f the [nineteenth] century, statistics
enable us to follow the course o f criminality. It has everywhere
increased. In France the increase is nearly 300 per cent (Durkheim
1986 [1895] 65) (emphasis added).

The Stage Theory o f Capitalism
Looked at through the lens established by the alienation paradigm, capitalism
might indeed be looked upon as something o f a flash in the pan, an anomaly in an
otherwise grand social pageant o f communitarian cooperation. The alienation paradigm
not only assumes that capitalism is a recent anomaly, but also that it is wholly
temporary. A sub-theory of this same paradigm, often expressed in academic writing, is
the notion that capitalist economies develop by stages. Thus, capitalism grows until the
various contradictions inherent in capitalism mount to crisis, and capitalism is
destroyed, fades away, or disintegrates. The final stage, like the ultimate paradise
foretold in the Bible, will be a return to the placid Garden of Eden where people shared
the earth’s resources. Engels claimed this final stage o f triumph would simply be a
return to these placid origins, o f togetherness and equality from whence humanity
rose— “a revival, in a higher form, o f the liberty, equality and fraternity o f the ancient
gentes” (1884, 22). Utopians tend to see the ancient world as the utopia they advocate
interupted by the ignominies o f the present.
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The origins o f this concept are ancient. The stage theory o f capitalism assumes
that capitalism—being merely a contemporary, western phenomenon—has a distinct
beginning, middle, and end. It began, according to Marx and Weber, in the late Middle
Ages when Europeans began to monetize time and labor,® passed through its midlife as
industrialization spread across the globe, and will end, according to Marxists, when
workers’ wages are suppressed to their lowest possible value. Caught in a “self
reinforcing spiral o f destructive competition”— western humanity lunges headlong
toward an ultimate date with the Armageddon envisioned by Marx and the author of
Revelations (Rosenau 2003, 6).
Like apocalyptic visionaries reading Revelations, alienationists have patiently
awaited capitalism’s overthrow. Many scholars have suggested we are now living in
“late” capitalism, or the final stage before utopia (e.g., Jameson 1993; Korten 1995;
Gautney 2003; Chomsky 2003). The credibility o f this claim, however, is undermined
by the recurrent claims of capitalism’s finality dating back to the time o f Marx. In
1916, Lenin wrote a book entitled Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f Capitalism, which
anticipated utopia no later than a few years after its publication. Borrowing from Marx,
Lenin proclaimed that imperialism was the “monopoly stage o f capitalism”— or the last
stage to be expected before capitalism’s overthrow. Lenin’s thesis was proved false,
however, when the imperial powers retreated from their empires throughout the world
in the post Word War Two period (Arrighi 1978, 9-34).
The idea that we at this precise moment are in the midst o f an especially hyperconsumerist, ultra-capitalist stage is part o f the current mainstream sociological
“paradigm.” As Ritzer states, “McDonaldization”— his code for hypercapitalism— “is
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an infinitely more mature and more powerful force today than it was when [he] first
began thinking about it two decades ago” (2000,xiii).
Even social scientists who have rebuked Marxism generally have nonetheless
accepted the idea that capitalism has stages and that it will ultimately play out and
disappear when class disparity becomes too stratified (Novak 1982; Drucker 1986).
Robert K. Merton, in his celebrated 1938 essay “Social Structure and Anomie” claimed
that there was “a growing body of evidence” to the effect that capitalism had entered a
climactic stage in which “our class structure is becoming rigidified and that vertical
mobility is declining” (1938, 273). Irving Louis Horowitz proclaimed in 1977 that
contemporary capitalist economies were in the midst o f “an intensification o f class
competition” (1977, 215).
Upon historical scrutiny, however, it is not difficult to find statements uttered
generations or even centuries ago suggesting life was in a peculiarly breakneck and
critical stage o f hecticness. Global trade has apparently always seemed breakneck. In
the year 1014, the Archbishop Wulfstan, preaching in York, proclaimed that “The world
is in a rush and is getting close to its end,” (Norberg 2003, 20). Washington Irving
wrote in 1822 that “Nations are fast losing their nationality. The great and increasing
intercourse, the exchange o f fashions and uniformity o f opinions by the diffusion o f
literature are fast destroying those peculiarities that formerly prevailed.” Tocqueville
wrote in the 1830s that American shipping entrepreneurs had accelerated the rate of
ocean-crossing commerce to the most cutthroat level imaginable even by that time. The
number o f ocean-going ships bearing U.S. flags, wrote Tocqueville, had “grown at
almost as quick a rate as the number o f [America’s] inhabitants” (Toqueville 401-402).
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The discovery o f oil as a source for locomotive energy in large quantities near
Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859 produced a similar level o f commentary about
“hypercapitalism.” A recurring oil boom with “the rush for leases, [ ] frantic
wildcatting, [ ] overproduction and wars among refiners, [] disastrous fires,” and the
hectic economic scramble for profits (Furnas 1969, 671).’ To some, this
hypercapitalism seemed to represent the “last” stage around the twentieth century, and
an immense progressive movement arose in the United States to arrest the runaway
machinery o f the oil, steel, and railroad empires o f the “robber barons.”
Although so many o f M arx’s theoretical propositions have been disproved by
events that occurred subsequent to his life (Lakatos 1978), few contemporary scholars
have challenged his “stage” theory o f capitalism. Indeed only a handful o f prominent
scholars have paused to question the idea that “capitalism” has a definitive beginning,
middle, and end. Dahrendorf (1997) wrote that this depiction o f a multi-stage
capitalism contains built-in contradictions. For juxtaposed against this conception o f
capitalism as a temporary state is a conception o f an extended reign of a utopian
collective or communitarian state which will follow capitalism’s defeat. Dahrendorf
suggested that this conception o f an indefinite collectivist utopia was “curriously static”
(p. 41).

Alienation Theorists Have Failed to Predict Dates
And if catastrophe has been imminent for capitalism for decades, the greatest
economic minds have failed to accurately predict when it will occur. In 1958, Harvard
economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote what became a renowned nonfiction best-
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seller, The Affluent Society. Galbraith claimed that the biggest corporations were
approaching absolute monopoly and were essentially immune to the marketplaee.
General Motors, according to Galbraith, was “large enough to control its markets” and
no longer feared competition over market share (Sowell 1995, 66). These predictions,
like those o f Marx, Engels, and Lenin before him, have been disproved (Sowell 1995,
66): dozens o f major corporations have folded, declined, or disappeared, and almost
half o f corporations on the Fortune 500 in 1980 were not there ten years later (Sowell
1995). During the latter half o f the twentieth century, small businesses gained market
share against big businesses (Norberg 2003).
If “capitalism” is not a stage, but an extension o f innate human tendency, then
there is no basis to assume that profit-driven capitalism alienates people from their true
nature. Humanity has not jumped o ff track, but is quite thoroughly and healthily on
track. “Capitalism”— open markets where individuals and firms are able to exchange
their goods and services freely—is the essence o f social health and vitality.
Consequently, attempts to arrest or hamper it lead to social disruption and dysfunction.

The Role o f Ideas
Scholars who contend that capitalism is a temporary condition tend also to argue
that capitalism depends on an ideology for its continuing existence. Weber’s
conception o f capitalism as a “spirit” in the title o f his most famous work furthered this
construction (Wrong 2004, 27). Karl Polany argued that “laissez-faire was planned”
(Blyth 2004, 118). Under the reconstruction o f these scholars, markets certainly existed
in history, but market society represents an entirely new social form, “in which labor is
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seen as just another factor o f production, divorced from notions o f reciprocity and
obligation” (Blyth 2004, 119). “This was the new world of laissez faire” (Blyth 2004,
119). “As Karl Polanyi shows in The Great Transformation, the emergence o f natural
markets in Europe was not the mechanical product o f the gradual extension o f economic
exchanges, but the product o f a deliberately mercantilist state policy aimed at increasing
domestic and foreign trade” (Bourdieu 2001, 2).
The spirit, or ideology o f capitalism that originated in Europe, was promoted by
merchants for their own interests, and made to seem rational by promoters in the
sciences and literature, notably Adam Smith. “[Ljaissez-faire actions come from
laissez-faire ideas and institutions they make possible” (Blyth 2004, 129).
“The new order needed a ‘philosophy,’” according to economic historian Robert
Heilbroner, “[a]nd such a philosophy was by no means self-evident” (Heilbroner 1975,
64). According to this view, “the new world o f profit-seeking individuals” was
dependent upon a small group o f self-interested mercantilist “pamphleteers” who
promoted capitalism as something o f a religion (Heilbroner 1975, 64). Chief among
these capitalist pampheleteers, of course, was the father o f economics, Adam Smith.
The philosophical underpinnings o f this “spirit,” according to alienation
theorists, began in the timultuous rejection o f Catholic orthodoxy during the Protestant
Reformation and were later reinforced by eighteenth-century pamphleteers like Adam
Smith. Eventually, this new economic paradigm spawned a new “cultural logic”— an
underlying paradigmatic orientation that pervades human life. Pauline Vaillancourt
Rosenau’s The Competition Paradigm (2003) describes capitalism as the product of a
theoretical paradigm—the competition paradigm— that is unsustainable. Capitalism has
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entered a purified form, says Jameson, whereby multinational corporations have greatly
increased the range o f “capitalized” and commercialized products and fostered a “a
prodigious expansion o f capital into hitherto uncommodified areas” (Jameson 1984,
78). Even art, architecture, and other aesthetic products have been commodified to be
bought and sold in the marketplace as merchandise (Jameson 1984).
Still others have alleged that capitalism was originally created by public
officials. Hine (2002, 50) suggests that “[tjhere is nothing ‘natural’ about markets” and
that market trading was invented by governments who intended traders to abide by strict
regulations. Since the dawn o f the Industrial revolution, however, market-exchange
economics has gotten loose from its state-sanctioned tethers and now holds the western
world in a hegemonic grip. Hine claims markets originated in Egypt and ancient
Greece and Turkey when rulers provided fairs and other venues for trade. Regional
city-states guaranteed protection to anyone on his or her way to the fairs (p. 58),
licensed vendors, and censored dishonest merchants (57, 56). During the fairs, a
“highly restrictive legal code” regulated and taxed vendors (56). “The fair was not
merely about commerce,” according to Hine, but was a time for celebration o f a patron
saint or devotion to religious officials, a holy day or “holiday.” In which the state acted
as market coordinator. In contrast,

[tjoday, most o f us spend our lives in a perpetual fair. Someone tries to
sell us something nearly every waking moment, and we can buy
casually, impersonall, with no wearing negotiation or personal contact.
The act o f consumption, which was once so exceptional an act in lives
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dominated by laborious production, is now commonlace and incessant.
We are all in the market all the time (Hine 2002, 59).

The original markets, according to Hine (2002, 56), required strict regulation by
the religious authorities who sanctioned them. “The market itself is a kind o f
battlefield, as both buyers and sellers seek to charm and intimidate their way to an
acceptable price.” Without state oversight, markets would quickly degenerate into
violent struggles for property ownership.

The Academic Consensus
Although by no means held universally,^ belief in an alienation explanation for
human violence is very popular in contemporary social science. Every professor o f
sociology’s office is adorned with bookshelves that contain works attributing human
violence to capitalism, greed, profiteering, lust for property, and class domination. The
belief that regulated economies are more peaceful than free market economies is widely
held among sociologists today (Edgerton 1993). Generations of scholars within the
social sciences have found themselves obsessed with debunking, exposing, battling, and
“ameliorating the damages” o f capitalism, as George Ritzer puts it (2004, xvi).
It can safely be said that the alienation proposition represents a broad consensus
o f opinion within sociology and other social sciences. This historical metanarrative has
even been promoted by the highest offices within the discipline o f Sociology. Joe R.
Feagin (2001,4), in his inaugural address as president o f the American Sociological
Association (ASA) in 2001, asserted without qualification that contemporary capitalism
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is to blame for “racial and ethnic oppression, patriarchy, homophobia, bureaucratic
authoritarianism, violence against children, and discrimination against the aged and the
disabled.” (Feagin 2001, 4). “Markets reduce everything, including human beings
(labor) and nature (land), to commodities” (4).
In the ASA’s official 1996 report on the social causes o f violence, authors Felice
J. Levine and Katherine J. Rosich indicated that violence, even when collective, is a
product o f individual, anti-social impulses and that a more communitarian, cooperative
society would ameliorate violence. Beginning with the statement that “American
society is engulfed in a world o f violence,” the 1996 report launched an ambitious drive
for more research (and research dollars) to answer the question o f what causes violence
in U.S. society (1, vii). “The pervasiveness o f violence, its spiraling negative impacts,
and the emergence of what appears to be an ingrained pattern o f violence are all
manifestations of a crisis at the most fundamental levels of our social order” the report
concluded (p. 1).
Reading this scholarship, one is tempted to believe that a link between growing
capitalism and increasing violence has been proven. But violent crime has fallen double
digits in the United States since the 1980s even while all indexes o f capitalism indicate
that most states have embarked on economic agendas that have generally emphasized
deregulation and freer markets (Apuzzo 2004). Violence appears to have declined
throughout most parts o f the world since the Second World War (Payne 2004). This has
been especially true in industrializing nations.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The overall trajectory o f capitalism perceived by Weber, Marx, and Durkheim appears
to be correct even if their dates were wrong. It seems undeniable that capitalism is
generally on the increase. However the perception that increasing capitalism generates
increasing social violence appears to rest on much shallower sand. Moreover, the
overarching proposition promoted by the alienation theorists, the notion that
“capitalism”—broadly defined— is a modem, artificial, western invention, dependent on
the spread o f a market ideology among its participants, seems vulnerable to increasingly
irreconcilable research findings
Scholars have been developing an increasingly mountainous record o f private
ownership o f land and property (and therefore, capital) since Polanyi’s early writings
(Frank 1993, 385). And since the 1970s, “the empirical and analytical refutation o f the
[Marx/Engels/Polany] argument has been almost unceasing. The evidence—primarily
from archaeological finds— has been substantial” (Frank 1993, 385).
The historical interpretations o f the founders o f sociology have fared poorly
against contemporary archaeological, anthropological, and historical developments. To
some extent the nineteenth- and early twentieth century theorists who spawned the
scientific study o f society may be excused because o f the state of anthropology and
archaeology at the time when these they wrote. Weber’s knowledge of ancient societies
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and civilizations, for example, was profound and rich, and perhaps as great as any
scholar o f his own period.^ But Weber wrote during the 1890s and early twentieth
century when accounts o f the economies o f ancient India, China and the Mediterranean
were either nonexistent or not abundant (Andreski 12). He thus was forced to consult
primary sources either translated or in the original Greek, Latin or Italian (each of
which Weber read fluently) (Weber 1983, 12). W eber’s resulting metathesis, like
Marx’s and Durkheim’s has been attacked by dozens if not hundreds o f works since the
1930s (Mackinnon 1993, 243). Marshall (1982) pointed out that Weber’s demarcation
between pre- and post Reformation economies is untenable. “Rational” firms, a free
market in labor and commodities, rational technology, a calculable legal system all
existed prior to the Protestant Reformation (Cohen 1980).
While Marx and Weber can be forgiven for making mistakes o f interpretation
regarding human economic history, contemporary scholars should be given no such
exemption, however, and their theoretical suppositions need to be strenuously examined
in light o f current knowledge.
The more knowledge we have, the more we know that the economic system
Weber attributed only to Western thinkers was actually far more common in the world
than Weber believed. Private property was well protected even in the Athenian courts
(Adams 1993, 66). The claims o f Weber, Marx, and Polanyi and their defenders in
anthropology, history, and sociology have long been challenged with regard to pre
industrial social and economic arrangements (Frank, 385). The evidence accumulated
during the twentieth century, according to David Herlihy (1971, 154-55) has “all but
wiped from the ledgers the supposed gulf, once thought fundamental, between a
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medieval manorial economy and the capitalism o f the modem period.” Ancient trade,
“both interlocal and international, was geographically extensive and highly profitable”'®
but had a feudal ruling class at the helm. (Weber 1983, 33). Since the 1970s,
researchers have developed an increasingly mountainous record o f private ownership of
land and property among ancient societies (Frank 1993, 385). “[T]he empirical and
analytical refutation o f the [stage theory] argument has been almost unceasing. The
evidence—primarily from archaeological finds—has been substantial” (Frank 1993,
385). Lamberg-Karlovsky (1975) found that profit, wholesaling, supply-demand
pricing and production, and private ownership o f land have “existed in a market
network at least by the end o f the fourth millennium in Mesopotamia.”

Trade in Early Civilization
By the time o f the first major civilizations in Sumeria and Mesopotamia,
commerce in goods and merchandise was already systematic. Clay tablets with
notations representing records o f barley transactions before the founding o f any o f the
early civilizations have been found at many locations (Robinson 1999, 62-63). By the
early second millennium B.C., trade routes with numerous ports o f call were evident
throughout the Old World, and private ships available for hire plied their trade over the
seas and oceans (Silver 1983, 821).
Frank (1993, 388) concluded that a “single world system [with] historical
continuity for at least 5,000 years, emerged with its core in West Asia and Egypt, and
then spread to encompass much o f Afro-Eurasia.” This system extended across
languages and into deepest Africa, the Far East, Although centered in West and
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Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, it extended far into three surrounding
continents (Frank 1993, 383). The motive force o f this worldwide system o f trade was
capital accumulation (Frank 1993, 388). Moreover, “profit-motivated trade extended
far beyond the political borders o f any state and connected . . . [all o f these] into a single
world system” (Kohl 1989, 227).

Markets in Labor
One of Weber’s most important and often-repeated points is that the Middle
Ages were special because they signaled a switch from slave and feudal labor systems
to market wage labor (141). Weber suggested that labor before this time was “unfree,”
and thus incapable o f sustaining capitalistic market economies (141). But evidence
accumulated since Weber’s death indicates he was incorrect on this point. There were
daily wages from 2000 B.C. in parts o f Eurasia, and wage rates determined by supply
and demand (Silver 1983, 809). A drachma per day in fifth- and fourth-century (B.C.)
Athens was a “standard wage” for most workers (Jones 1952, 26). There were both sale
and rental markets for slaves in Babylon, suggesting that slave labor was integrated into
an overall supply-and-demand labor system (Silver 808). Marx and Weber also
overstated the role o f feudal production relationships even in the Middle Ages. H alf o f
English peasants worked for wages during the fourteenth century (Hejeebu and
CcCloskey 2004: 136).
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The Commodification O f Humanity
Alienation theorists like former ASA President Joe Feagin have sometimes
claimed that the commodification o f humanity brought on by modem capitalism
explains why capitalism is so harmful to social health (Feagin 2001, 4). Yet the sale
and purchase o f humanity in various contexts has an ancient pedigree. Bail bonds to
secure a prisoner’s release were known in Ancient Egypt from at least 250 B.C.
(Reichel 2002, 80). Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004; 137) point out that“[i]n the
European Middle Ages more (depending on how you count these things) was for sale
than is for sale now: husbands, wives, slaves, serfs, kingdoms, market days, and eternal
salvation.” “Medieval Europe was thoroughly monetized” (137).
Medieval systems o f criminal justice were also much more monetized than
criminal justice systems o f today. Medieval courts operated in accordance with the
profits they made for monarchs that administered them (Diamond 1978, 250). This was
tme in Norman-age England as well as eleventh century Russia, where Article 1 o f the
code provided for simple systems o f fines for even the most heinous crimes:

If a man kills a man . . . the brother is to avenge his brother; the son, his
father; or the father, his son; and the son o f the brother (of the murder
victim) or the son o f his sister, their respective uncle. If there is no
avenger (the murderer) pays 40 grivna wergild . . . (Diamond 1978,
244).

The law o f the Visigoths, circa 700 A.D., similarly stated that

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Whoever shall have killed a man, whether he committed a homicide
intendeing to or not intendeing to . . . let him be handed over into the
protestas o f the parents or next o f kin o f the deceased . . . (Diamond
1978, 244).

If anything, the employment o f labor in the ancient world was much more
diverse than it is in western societies today. There were many more types o f
employment contracts, forms o f servitude, and slavery. A huge slave trade, with great
fluctuations in price, thrived throughout the ancient Eurasian tricontinental region
(Silver 1983, 808). Slavery in the ancient world often provided opportunities for slaves
to prosper, buy or be granted their freedom and move up through class ranks. In ancient
Rome, commerce and industry were heavily led by businessmen who were former
slaves (Baumol 1990, 900). Slavery “may have represented the one avenue for
advancement for someone from the lower classes” (900). After acquiring business
experience, a slave might be retired into the ranks o f investor and businessman. Many
apparently retired wealthy in the countryside with investments in land and banking
(900).

Banking In Early Civilizations
As Hoskins (1985, 5) wrote, “Since the earliest times there have been banks and
bankers,” “operated simply to bring a person with money together with a person who
needed money and together they became partners in a Joint Venture business enterprise.
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For this service banks charged fee.” Clay lending tokens issued by bankers are found in
great quanitites today in the Eurasian excavations o f ancient Babylon (Hoskins 1985, 6).
There were both government banks and private banks such as the Igibi Bank which
flourished in 575 B. C. (Hoskins 1985, 6). “These banks offered almost every service
offered by banks today including the use o f checking, savings, letters o f credit, and the
Babylonian form o f paper money—the clay tablet” (Hoskins 1985, 6). In ancient
Egypt, a canal dug from the Nile to the Red Sea was a commercial speedway. Boats
coming fom India could stop by banking barges anchored in the canal and get a loan
“day or night” (Hoskins 1985, 6).

Relationships Between Commerce And War
If ever there was a time in human history when profit motives were nonexistent,
historical texts have failed to identify this period. The claim made hy alienation
theorists that greed and avarice are a product o f industrialism are false. Judas, after all,
betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces o f silver around A.D. 33.
Competition over the fruits o f business seems to have heen a factor in many of
the world’s early wars. The very first well-documented war, the Trojan War, was
fought over trading rights in the Aegean Sea (Keegan 1993, 241). Many other wars in
ancient times were actually efforts to recruit labor for commercial ventures. Max
Weber characterized many ancient wars as “slave raids” because their purpose was to
“throw more supplies upon the slave market” (Weber 1983, 141). Commercialism and
profit motives were behind much o f European colonialism during the seventeenth and
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eighteenth centuries. Nearly all settlements in North America were commercial
ventures even centuries before the industrial revolution (Hine 2002).
Even the seemingly moralistic American abolitionists whose agitation against
slavery drove the United States to civil war in 1860 were buoyed by selfish economic
interests: northerners thought slave labor put them at a disadvantage in the marketplace
(Hall 1987, xii).

Similar economic motivations fueled southern secessionists: federal

tariff rates imposed by northern policymakers to equalize the southern slave advantage
made trade barriers restrictively high for the South’s cotton economy and drove
southerners to seek restoration o f free trade through violence (DiLorenzo 2004). So
too, slavery was finally eradicated throughout the world because o f economic
considerations. The nail in the coffin o f worldwide slavery was its relative inefficiency
as a system for delivering labor services. Slave workers had no economic incentives to
work hard and consequently sat idle when not watched (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 3).
Taxation o f business and commerce was also a prevalent cause o f wars in
history. Taxation in the Roman Empire is credited by many historians with fostering
violent revolts that ultimately destroyed the Roman Empire (Payne 2004, 203). The
French Revolution was caused in part by the burdensome French tax system (Payne
2004, 206). During the initial uprising, tax offices were sacked and a wall erected to
prevent the flow o f untaxed goods into Paris was tom down. As the Revolution
progressed, thirty-four top tax officials were executed (p. 206). The American
Revolution, o f course, was an effort to repeal a series o f tax acts that impeded the flow
o f goods in commerce across the Atlantic Ocean. Many o f the initial targets o f violence
by colonists were government tax collectors.
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The distinction between modem industrial capitalism and pre-medieval markets
has been shown to be a fiction. So too, the proposition that westem industrial capitalism
represents a stark transformation in human behavior has been undermined by
scholarship written subsequent to the publication o f The Protestant Work Ethic.
Seeking evidence o f capitalist trade in the ancient world was once much like
trying to find the evidence that Darwin (1995) cited as support for his theory of
evolution. The geologic record, wrote Darwin, was “a history o f the world imperfectly
kept, and written in a changing dialect; o f this history we possess the last volume alone,
relating to only two or three countries; O f this volume, only here and there a short
chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines” (p. 166).
But we are approaching sufficient evidence to make a few statements about the
accuracy o f the prehistoric narrative of the alienation theorists; they were wrong about
the dearth o f for-profit private trade prior to the Middle Ages. As scholarly inquiries
have delved deeper and deeper into the past, their discoveries of commerce in the
ancient world have expanded exponentially. Ancient peoples are now seen as much
more technologically skilled, numerous, and organized than archaeologists previously
believed (Milanich 2004). Merely comparing the definitions of capitalism provided by
Weber, Polanyi, et al., with the findings o f modem archaeology undermines the
alienation proposition. Polanyi’s definition of “market economy” required as many as a
half-dozen distinct elements, including (1) consumer goods, (2) commodified land, (3)
labor through supply and demand, risk bearing individual enterprise, and loan markets
(Silver 1983, 796). Similarly, W eber’s definition required no fewer than six distinct
phenomena acting in unison: 1) the appropriation o f means o f production are in private
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hands 2) there are free markets, 3) there is mechanization o f production, 4) predictable
law governing business affairs, 5) free labor, and 6) a ’’commercialization o f economic
life”—meaning a robust culture o f commercial (i.e., banking and financing) instruments
(Weber 1999, 44). All o f these have existed since the second millenium B.C. in the
Near East, and probably earlier and elsewhere.
We now know that even Adam Smith underestimated the extent of prehistoric
commerce and thus can be said to have underplayed his position. Smith plotted the rise
o f agribusiness and manufacturing as first appearing in Egypt (Smith 1991 [1776], 27).
He suggested, in error, that ancient Rome represented the first appearance o f minted
coins, pointing to references by Pliny the Elder to the effect that coined money first
appeared in the time o f Servius Tullius. But in fact, coins are substantially older.
Archeologists have found coins and other media o f exchange (and thus, evidence of
standardized trade, if not “capitalism”) among the artifacts o f some o f the earliest
protocivilized societies, from ancient Mesopotamia to Phoenicia, to Sumeria, to the
ancient Americas (Frank 1993; McCAdams 1992; Silver 1983; Brumfiel 1980; Waddell
1929). According to Toynbee’s Study o f History, more than 650 primitive societies
have been categorized by anthropologists, and since “most o f these have used one or
more forms o f primitive money, it follows that the subject o f primitive money is o f vast
proportions” and that the tendency to invent currency is something o f a universal human
trait (Davies 1994, 34).
To the extent that coins represent evidence o f routinized exchange o f property
among individuals, we have evidence that ancient societies on every inhabited continent
engaged in such exchanges once they were able to shape materials into coins. Almost
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every conceivable precious metal, with the exception o f platinum and palladium, seem
to have been used as media o f exchange at one time or another (Silver 1983, 818).
Coins, or currency, “one o f the finest achievements o f human reasoning powers”
(Temple 99), represent a systematic means o f measuring value that drastically decreases
transaction costs (Silver 1983).
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CHAPTER 4

ALIENATION AND THE ARCHEOLOGICAL RECORD
Archaeology, like sociology, owes its origins to the late nineteenth century and
did not begin in professional earnest until the 1870s (Amsden 1949, 22).
Archaeological knowledge was limited to scattered and poorly catalogued finds,
anecdotes, and conjecture. Marx never knew o f the findings o f Sir Arthur John Evans,
or o f Hiram Bingham, and Weber was an old man when the first diggings were made at
the tomb of Tutankhamen.
Thus, it stands to reason that the theoretical underpinnings o f the early
sociologists suffered from blindness where they depended upon knowledge of
anthropology and archaeology. Stated more accurately, the interpretations o f ancient
societies advanced by the founders o f sociology were largely conceptual rather than
factual. And we now know that some o f these early conceptions were quite simply
wrong.
M arx’s interpretation o f economic history fares especially poorly when
juxtaposed against the archeological record. Not only is capitalism much older than
orthodox Marxism has depicted it, but capitalism is decidedly more diverse in its
origins. The archeological record now seems to indicate that market economies with
property-right protection arose separately in different parts o f the globe. Civilized
societies developed currencies generally before they developed written languages.

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first great civilizations were empires of private as well as public trade.
Ancient Egypt was a mecca for transcontinental trade in commodities from three
continents. Egyptian mines were yielding forty thousand kilograms o f gold per year
during the second millennium B.C., an amount which was never again reached in world
production until the nineteenth century (Oliver and Page 1970, 39)." Marxist social
scientists have long argued that Egypt was a centrally-controlled redistributive society
(Silver 801). But Silver (1983, 801) points out that “private ownership as well as sale
and leasing o f land are found throughout Egyptian history.” Interest-bearing loans
apparently existed in grain (801) circa 2000 B.C. “It is well known that private
individuals could own farm land at all periods of ancient Egyptian history” (Silver
1983, 807, citing Baer 1962).
“By the middle centuries o f the fourth m illennium ,. . . [t]he trade relations of
Gerzean Egypt were very extensive” (Oliver and Page 1970, 34). Metals like lead and
silver were regularly imported from island ports in the Aegean sea (Oliver and Page
1970, 34). Shipbuilders were building vessels of sixty oars (Oliver and Page 1970, 34).
Egypt thrived in later second millennium B.C., with constant stream of oil, wine, olives,
fish, cucumbers, salt, garments, and papyrus (821).
Historians and archaeologists have debated Egypt’s fall from prominence for
centuries. One of the most compelling explanations is simple economic competition.
Like the once-gigantic A & P grocery chain that succumbed to the explosion o f discount
suburban U.S. supermarkets o f the 1950s and ‘60s (Sowell 2000, 59-62), Egypt found
itself unable to adjust to the age o f iron. Discoveries around the ancient ruins o f Meroe,
in central Africa, have found piles o f iron slag suggesting that Meroe became a
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Birmingham o f the ancient world (Oliver and Page 1970, 41). But due to its geography
and centuries o f overgrazing, Egypt had neither iron ore nor fuel with which to smelt it
(Oliver and Page 1970, 41).

Political Economy In Ancient Texts
If “capitalism” represents the implementation o f an ideology that was recently
imposed upon human societies, one is hard pressed to identify when in the history of
human discourse people first began to state their belief in this ideology." And if
recognition of private property was rare in ancient societies, m an’s earliest documents
are highly unrepresentative o f ancient human cultures. Adam Smith’s first rule— the
law o f supply and demand, and the corresponding fact that items in short supply sell at
high prices—was expressed at least two thousand years before the birth of Adam Smith,
in the later second millennium B.C. (Silver 1983, 808). Since time immemorial, when
people have written about their lives, they have written about markets, trade goods,
property, and commerce. Much o f what we know about humanity’s past is to be found
in written records, and many o f the earliest written records were business documents.
The earliest and most recurring myths, upon examination, often deal with the quest for
riches. “[A] lot o f our heroic literature is about someone who is trying to get his hands
on a valuable object. Jason sailed after the Golden Fleece. The Arthurian legends
recount the quest for the Holy Grail. W agner’s characters and Tolkien’s, too, are after a
ring” (Hine 2002, 9).
In the land known to myth as the Garden o f Eden, to history as ancient Babylon,
and to modernity as Iraq," texts from the later third millennium already show street
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vendors and, “the use o f silver to pay rentals and purchase dates, oil, barley, animals,
slaves, and real estate” (Silver 1983, 817). “[NJumerous lending contracts o f an entirely
commercial nature” have been identified dating from ancient Babylon in the second
millennium B.C. (Silver 1983, 803). Trade in ancient Babylon apparently reached a
breakneck pace around the 1800s (B.C.) when Babylonian businessmen were engaged
in a variety o f enterprises in the Persian Gulf. Thirty-three pounds o f gold was payment
for one private contract (Silver 1983, 804). Speculation contracts which specified
penalties for future violations, promissory notes payable to the bearer(s), real estate
deeds, and letters o f credit were all in use by the fourteenth century B.C. (Silver 1983,
804-806). Sales and leases of real estate were common in Mesopotamia throughout its
history, and land markets offered guarantees o f good title (Silver 1983, 806). Loan
documents have been found evidencing financial transactions from the middle to the
end o f the third millennium B.C. throughout Egypt, Babylon, and the ancient near east
(Silver 1983, 802). Many people are familiar with the Hippocratic Oath— an agreement
to create and work within a trade union originating (probably) around 400 B.C. in
Greece. This oath was a private contract between members o f a medical guild and their
untrained assistants (Miles 2003).

Earliest Law Codes
The earliest law codes— the Code o f Hammurabi and the Eshnunna Code, spoke
o f establishment o f standard weights, protected private property, attempted to regulate
interest rates, mentioned daily wages for farm labor as payable in silver or grain, and
punished harms to property by fine (Williams 1997, 18). The Code o f Hammurabi
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(circa 1792-1750 B.C.) “emphasized property rights and spoke to such issues as theft,
ownership, and interpersonal violence” (Reichel 2002, 80). Its rules were developed by
traders throughout Mesopotamia, emphasizing commercial law and providing
“reasonable examples o f today’s deeds, partnerships, and other contract forms” (Reicher
1996,80y

The Bible
Recall the Bible’s many admonitions against greed and its instructions to live
selflessly. These statements were rendered within a text that was otherwise replete with
stories o f commerce, trade, and profit. The Bible, one o f the most detail-rich sources of
information about ancient Eurasia, contains hundreds o f references to commerce,
business, and entrepreneurialism {see, e.g.. Genesis 23:12-18; 2 Kings 7:1; Amos 8:4-5;
Proverbs 11:26). Many o f the featured subjects o f the Bible, including Abraham and
Solomon, were wealthy businessmen (Asimov 1971). Moreover, much o f the Bible’s
content consists o f rags-to-riches stories, extolling an apparent economic mobility even
in a society where various government authorities resisted the empowerment o f the
poor. The Bible describes as heroic numerous struggles by entrepreneurs to evade the
taxation and regulatory avarice o f government authorities, such as Gideon’s
concealment o f wheat from Midianite rulers who would otherwise “destroy the produce
o f the earth as far as Gaza, and leave no sustenance in Israel” (Judges 6:1-6).
The first books of The Bible were apparently a collection o f ancient traditions,
reduced to writing beginning in the ninth century B.C. and continuing until the time of
Christ (Asimov 1968). The Bible also contains a number o f legal codes— and like
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other early legal codes, the Biblical Law o f Moses contains references to greed, envy
for property o f others, and business affairs. It advises its readers to commit themselves
to business ethics and to employ accurate and equitable accounting methods {see, e.g..
Proverbs 11:1; 20:23)." Note also that the Bible’s Mosaic laws (which include the Ten
Commandments), probably date to 900 B.C. and clearly recognize private property
(“Thou shalt not steal”) and title in land (“Ye shall inherit their land . . . that floweth
with milk and honey” (Leviticus 20:24)."
Scrutiny of the Old Testament reveals passages indicating that pre-industrial
mass commercial production was occurring at some locations. There are references to a
Babylonian “city of metal workers” (1 Chronicles 4:14), and a “valley o f craftsmen”
(Neh. 11:35). A vision by the prophet Ezekiel described merchants rich with
inventories o f wine, wool, cloth, spices, gems, and gold, who engaged in extremely
profitable trade with traveling merchants from throughout the Middle East:

All the ships o f the sea and the sailors in them visited you to trade with
you . . . People paid you in silver and iron, tin and lead for your
merchandise . . . They bartered men and bronze implements. The
people of Beth-togarmah traded you horses, chargers, mules . . . You
were paid in ivory tusks and ebony. Edom exchanged carbuncles,
purple, embroideries, fine linen, coral and rubies against your goods.
Judah and the land of Israel also traded with you, supplying you with
com . .. wax, honey, tallow and balm (Ez. 27:9).
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Many scholars have suggested that capitalism was generated by Christianity
(Weber 1930; Murray 2004). Yet Hejeebu and McCloskey (2004) note that Christianity
glorifies capitalism much less than other major religions. They note the contrast
between the Lord’s Prayer, which requests only “our daily bread,” with the Hindu
prayer to Durga, the Mother Goddess: “Give me wealth, long life, sons, and all things
desirable” (139). Hindus also pray to Ganesha at the outset o f any project for
“longevity, desired powers, and prosperity” (140). The Vedic hymns are similarly filled
with prayers for treasure and wealth (140). Zoroastrianists pray for “rewards,
compensation, and hospitality” and for their communities, “possessions, prosperity,. . .
and easeful life” (140). Buddha’s “Admonition to Singala” likewise proclaims a
philosophy never stated better by a neoliberal capitalist:

The wise and moral man . . .
Makes money like a bee . . .
Such a man makes his pile
As an anthill, gradually . ..
. . . He should divide
His money in four parts:
On one part he should live.
With two expand his trade.
And the fourth he should save
Against a rainy day (Hejeebu and McCloskey 2004, 136).
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Taxation In Early Documents
The earliest textual artifacts also manifest evidence o f taxation, which by its
very nature represents a taking o f private property or wealth by governmental authority.
There is no known civilization that did not tax, and the dawn o f the first civilization we
know anything about— ancient Sumeria— is recorded on clay cones recorded the
taxation o f the period (Adams 1993, 2). Indeed, a “large percentage o f all ancient
documents are tax records o f one kind or another” (Adams 1993, 21). The ancient
Egyptians taxed almost everything, including sales, slaves, imports, exports, and
businesses (Adams 1993, 7). The Rosetta Stone, “the most important Egyptian
archaeological discovery o f all time,” according to Charles Adams (1993, 17) was
actually a tax document: it gave notice o f a tax immunity for a religious temple.
Taxation was also at the roots o f the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, rooted in the tax
struggles o f the ancient Hebrews against Greek taxation (Adams 1993, 39-43).

The Law’s Growing Recognition O f Private Trade Rights
There is one sense in which the Weberian definition o f capitalism accurately
reflects the conditions necessary for well-functioning free markets. Capitalistic
production is most efficient when protected by codes o f law that limit the authority o f
governments to intervene in private commerce. While the private contracts of the
ancient world served to add predictability to exchanges between private parties and
merchants, they did not restrain government authorities from intruding in personal
business affairs with every manner o f confiscatory taxation and seizure o f property.
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What kept capitalist investment from becoming fully routinized in the ancient
world was the arbitrariness o f government economic regulation. “For thousands o f
years, governments around the world have attempted to set the prices and control
supplies” (Payne 2004, 255). Rarely have authorities resisted the temptation to tax and
regulate commerce when they had power to. Trade in commercial markets largely
operated around such regulation.
It seems that with the passing generations, however, written codes o f law tended
to become more tolerant of rational trade, and less arbitrary in their control over
economic matters. The Edict o f Diocletian (1939), drafted circa 301 A.D. and issued
and ratified in the name o f four Caesars, established a maximum schedule o f prices for
commodities and services throughout the Roman Empire. This edict was purportedly
the law o f the land across several nations for years; inscriptions o f it have been found on
tablets found at different places in Greece and Asia Minor. The Edict imposed the
death penalty on merchants throughout the empire who charged more than the prices of
Caesar. “No one should deem this a harsh measure,” the Edict proclaimed, since any
merchant could easily “avoid its severity by keeping his profits within bounds.” Death
was also imposed upon merchants who declined to trade commodities they possessed,
or who hoarded commodities if the public needed them.
It is not clear if the Edict o f Diocletian was ever rescinded or stricken from the
laws o f Rome, but historians note that this code dropped into disuse after merchants
went out o f business and scarcity o f products increased. In some cases, merchants were
required to sell commodities at lower prices than they paid for them, and bloody street
brawls and violence followed (p. 3). Nonetheless, the Edict represented a long step
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toward legal sanction for routinized trade and standardized taxation and regulation o f
business. Although predictability in trade relations was the purpose behind most inter
merchant contracts, the intrusion o f sovereigns into commercial affairs had previously
been something unpredictable, a domain o f great discretion. Law, like other institutions
o f civilization, took time to develop.
Bills o f rights which sought to codify or limit the powers o f states were rare or
nonexistent in ancient texts. The Magna Carta, signed under duress by King John of
Great Britain in 1215 A.D., may represent the first attempt to establish formal written
limitations on the power o f a sovereign. But with each passing century, there were
more and more such documents. The English Bill o f Rights was drafted in 1689, the
French Declaration o f the Rights o f Man in 1789, and the American Bill o f Rights in
1791. To the extent that markets function best where property rights are predictable,
there is support for the idea that rationalized capitalism was on the gradual increase over
this period.
Robinson (1999) notes that writing itself probably arose from primitive tallies of
business transactions in ancient Mesopotamia. Although scholars o f early written
languages have been intensely interested in certain important documents, most early
writing consisted o f mundane identity markings and property markers (10). The earliest
known evidence o f writing came from Sumeria around 3300 B.C., probably growing
out of a long-standing counting system o f clay tokens to keep track o f goods and
commodities in trade (11). Such tallies and clay tokens had been used since around
8,000 BC to represent inventories of sheep, grain, or other commodities (58-59). Later
tokens and clay “envelopes” may have functioned as early bills o f lading to accompany
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merchandise shipments (60). Indeed, the evolution o f written language probably
reflected the increasing complexity o f commercial affairs throughout the Indo-European
zone (62). Writing probably evolved from similar origins in the Inca civilization across
the Atlantic (55).
Marxist historians long believed that Egypt was a redistributive society with
administrative management o f property (Silver 1983, 801). But we now know that
“private ownership as well as sale and leasing o f land are found throughout Egyptian
history” (801). Loan documents involving private persons have been found from the
middle to the end o f the third millennium (2500-3000 B.C.) throughout Egypt, Babylon,
and the ancient near east (Silver 1983, 802). There were both sale and rental markets
for slaves in Babylon (Silver 1983, 808) and daily wages from 2000 B.C. determined by
supply and demand (Silver 1983, 809). Tanning, metal, garment, and winemaking were
all done on massive scales in the second millenium B.C. (811-812).

The Americas
Interpretations o f archaeological discoveries in the Westem Hemisphere, for
example, have blown some gaping holes in the Marxist/Weberian “stage” thesis.
According to Henry F. Dobyns (1966), there were more people living in the Americas
in 1491 than in Europe (Mann 2002, 43). The sparsely populated New World described
by the first European visitors to North America was already artificially low— reduced
by the wildfire spread o f disease brought by Italian, French, and Spanish explorers like
Columbus and DeSoto in the 15**^ and 16* centuries. “The first whites to explore many
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parts o f the Americas may therefore have encountered places that were already
depopulated” (Mann 2002, 43).
Alfred Crosby’s The Columbian Exchange: Biological Consequences o f 1492
(2003) concluded the Indian groups o f central Mexico independently created nearly all
the major Neolithic innovations that were invented in Sumeria and Mesopotamia in the
third millenium BC. And, as in Eurasia, written languages apparently evolved as a
means o f accounting by traders.
The American civilizations, though lacking the wheel and steel, handily
outmatched the early European civilizations in agriculture, developing strains o f com,
tomatoes, and potatoes that later sustained societies worldwide (Mann 2002, 48-49).
One theory is that the Amazon rain forest was originally planted as an orchard by
Native Americans farming fruits, nuts, and palms about 4,000 years ago (Mann 2002,
51). In the Americas, this agribusiness sustained some o f the world’s largest and most
omate cities, several o f which were larger than Paris or London in the 1500s. Unlike
European cities, the central American cities employed large forces to keep the crowded
streets clean o f sewage and detritis (Mann 2002, 49). Evidence o f the immense distance
traveled by American farming culture can be seen in the fact that John Smith found
Massachusetts in 1614 to be “so planted with gardens and Come fields” that it amazed
him (Mann 2002, 49). The original strains o f these com plants had been developed
thousands o f miles away in South and Central America.
In 1539, Hemando De Soto, “half-warrior, half venture capitalist,” according to
Mann (2002, 44), landed at Tampa Bay with 600 soldiers, 200 horses, and 300 pigs.
For four years. De Soto’s disease-carrying army tmdged through what is now the
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American Southeast in search o f gold. Although De Soto himself died on the
expedition, the accounts o f his surviving soldiers record the existence o f heavily
populated large towns and small cities in which many hundreds o f native Americans
lived in close proximity. They also noted wide streets, markets filled with goods from
hundreds o f miles away, and ornately decorated buildings (Mann 2002, 49).
The diseases o f the Spanish took an immense toll on the cities of ancient North
America. No European visited these parts o f the Mississippi valley for more than a
century afterward, when the French explorers who ventured into the same areas found
them deserted. Our contemporary perception o f early Native Americans as nomadic
hunters, according to UCLA’s Russell Thornton, was created by the epidemics that
wiped out these ancient Indian civilizations o f North America. (Mann 2002, 45).
The disaster o f epidemics wrought by the De Soto, Columbus, Cortez, and other
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century expeditions left the New World virtually deserted by
the seventeenth century when the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth. We now know that the
astounding tales told by De Soto’s troops have been authenticated by archaeological
findings. For the most part, these findings have come after the deaths o f Marx, Weber,
and Durkheim.
Archaeological discoveries involving the ancient Americas indicate that the
Westem Hemisphere— like Europe, Asia, and Africa—was traversed by merchants and
traders apparently acting individually over generations and geographic distances, and
was typified by levels o f social violence substantially greater than levels experienced in
westem nations in the twenty-first century. Research at Huexotia in eastem Mexico
dating to the Aztec period (ca. A.D. 1150-1519) shows that the daily markets contained
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“an astonishing variety o f goods and were attended by thousands o f people” (Brumfiel
1980, 460). Great “quantities o f salt, spindle whorls, obsidian, and probably cloth from
nonlocal sources” (Brumfiel 1980, 460). “By the date o f Spanish conquest, market
exchange had existed in the Valley o f Mexico for at least two centuries” (Brumfiel
1980,460).
Going back even further, evidence o f highly-developed market-based
civilizations have been identified throughout the Westem Hemisphere. “As long as
people have populated North America, economic incentives have been at work”
(Barrington 1999a, 4). Textile weaving was as advanced in the Americas 10,000 years
ago as anywhere in the world (Barrington 1999a). The southwestem Anasazi
constmcted dams and irrigation canals since at least 1300 A.d. The Cahokia civilization,
which thrived for hundreds of years before Europeans began to explore North America,
engaged in an immense trade in flint and copper and had a large network of trade
routes that criss-crossed the Arkansas, Missouri, and Ohio Rivers (Barrington 1999a).
By 1000 A.D., the Cahokia had constmcted some o f the largest man-made stmctures in
the world. The Huron maintained trade routes for hundreds o f years that extended from
one end o f the Great Lakes to the other (Barrington 1999a, 6). It seems, even, that the
arrival o f Europeans merely integrated with, rather than displaced this trade, and that it
utilized the same trade routes.
The more we discover about the ancient world, the more complex its patterns of
exchange and travel become. “We have evidence that the mammoth hunters o f the
Russian steppes obtained Mediterranean shells in trade, as did also the Cro-Magnon
hunters o f the central valleys o f France” (Heilbroner 1975, 23). Ancient human remains
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with blond hair and Caucasian features have been found far outside Europe in places as
far removed as China and North America (Bahn 1996, 152). Mummies found in the
Altai mountains o f Russia dating from the last millennium B.C. have been found with
silk artifacts from as far away as China and Persia (Bahn 1996,151).

These

seemingly bizarre misplacements were at one time seen as fakes or fruits o f faulty
analysis—but are now considered testaments to a world-crossing commerce o f peoples
and goods that proceeded contemporary globalization by thousands o f years. The past
is now seen as much more diverse than we once imagined; Caucasian corpses in westem
China are adomed in the clothing o f westem societies, suggesting travel, rather than
migration or colonization. Archaeologists continue to bump into artifacts and
specimens that are grossly out o f place according to their previous interpretations of
human history. Recently-discovered evidence o f human habitation on the Yana River
in Siberia dating to circa 30,000 B.C., for example, shows that human occupation in the
Arctic is twice as old as previously known (Stewart 2004).

The Evidence From Linguistics
The research o f linguists confirms the immensity of this prehistoric commerce
among the earth’s peoples. Word roots common to languages on several continents
reveal that humans in antiquity are all, in the broadest sense, members o f an immense
network o f intercultural trade and exchange. For example, Sanskrit, the ancient
language o f India, has been shown to be related to Latin and Greek (Rudgley, 35).
Iranian, Indian, Slavic, Celtic, Germanic, Italic, Greek, Lithuanian and Albanian are all
branches o f the Indo-European language family (Rudgley 35). These languages— and
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others even further removed in west Asia and Africa apparently split off before the
advent of agriculture (Rudgley 42). A common “Nostratic” language that was the
mother toungue 10,000 to 15,000 years ago (Rudgley 42). Indeed the seven global
language etymologies share many basic terms for man, woman, child, hole, vulva,
finger, and water—words that correspond across hundreds or more languages. As
Rudgley writes (p. 44), “It seems absolutely remarkable that such correspondences
should exist across time and space and that languages found as far a field as the deserts
of southern Africa, the Amazon rain forest, the Arctic and the cities o f Europe still
retain links from a remote time when they were all closely connected” (p. 44). The
evidence is “striking and is hard to dismiss simply as mere coincidence” (p. 45).
By the Middle Ages, commerce over Europe was so extensive that even the
tiniest and most isolated town— “a dot on the map without so much as a road to connect
its few hundred souls to the outer world” was visited by dozens of traders on a monthly
basis (Heilbroner 1975, 49). '‘[P]rofit-motivated trade extended far beyond the political
borders o f any state and connected . . . [all o f these] into a single world system” (Kohl
1989,227).
Even the world’s oldest fully preserved human body, the “Iceman” found by
German hikers in the Italian Alps in 1991, was in possession o f garments and tools of
copper and flint that established the existence o f mining and smelting operations o f
some intermediate level (Bahn 1996, 140-145). His hair showed heavy contamination
with copper and arsenic, which suggested exposure to early industrial copper smelting
o f malachite or azurite ore some 5,300 years ago (145). Precisely where such metals
were mined and processed remains unknown; however, copper production was heavy
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around the Arabian peninsula during the period (Frank 1993, 394). If the Iceman’s
tools were forged thereabouts, they traveled the better part o f a thousand miles. By
1500 B.C., métallurgie factories and processing centers had developed over a chain o f
provinces stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic (Frank 1993, 396).
Mining on a huge scale occurred in the Ural Mountains as well as Kazakhstan,
the Altai Mountains and Russia; two million metric tons of ore was mined and some
100,000 tons o f copper was smelted at just two Kazakh sites (Frank 1993, 396). Copper
ore was systematically transported 300 kilometers through the mountains o f Eurasia; tin
was traded over a 1,000 kilometer commercial route (Frank 1993, 396). “Caravan
cities” rose like railroad towns, and the entreprenuers melded widespread differences o f
culture and language into a common commercial language (Frank 1993, 401).
But this commerce was often at arms length due to the constant threat o f violence.
Spears and shields were the everyday attire o f merchants. “Without being armed,”
wrote Tacitus, “they transact nothing, whether o f public or private” (Payne 2004, 30).
The Ice Man o f the Italian Alps mentioned above was initially reported to the world as
having died mysteriously; initial examinations showed no signs o f violent death (Bahn
1996, 140). But subsequent X-rays showed the body to have been slain by an arrow
(“Iceman’s last two meals included big game meat” 2002). Thus, this single human
specimen refutes two o f the major components o f the alienation thesis: it exemplifies
violent death within a commercial theatre some five millennia before the Industrial
Revolution.
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Factories
Recall that one o f Max Weber’s precepts for distinguishing modem capitalism
from the markets o f antiquity involved the absence o f factories in the latter and their
presence in the former. But we now know o f the existence o f many production
operations in the ancient past o f immense size and output. There were actual factories
in fifth-century B.C. Babylon that produced and bottled oil in containers for delivery
throughout three continents (Silver 1983, 812). Archaeologists recently unearthed an
ancient brewery in southern Pern that operated more than 1,000 years ago. The brewery
pre-dated the Incan empire by at least four centuries and was capable o f producing
thousands o f liters o f beer-like grain alcohol per day for consumption in the region
(Babwin 2004). Granaries privately owned with no apparent connection to either
government or religious temples were used by agricultural merchants throughout
Eurasia before the time o f Christ (Silver 1983, 801). Tanning, metal, garment,
winemaking were all done on massive scales in the second millenium B.C. (Silver 1983,
811-812). “In what can only be called an industrial revolution,” an iron industry
flourished in northeast China between 910 and 1126 (Williams 2003, 140). Production
reached 125,000 to 150,000 tons by AD 1078, a level similar to the total westem and
Russian European output o f the early nineteenth century and only surpassed Great
Britain in 1796 (Williams 2003, 140).
No one has ever identified a society living or dead whose members engaged in
no advantageous commerce with others. Foimer American Anthropological
Association president Emestine Friedl (1978) documented exchanges by members of
rival primitive hunter-gatherer societies o f goods like flint, salt, and tools. Many
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accounts o f explorers’ first contacts with natives in exotic lands illustrate the
willingness o f natives to trade services and commodities despite every barrier o f
language and culture. European slave traders began kidnapping Africans for
enslavement and transportation to the Westem Hemisphere in the 1600s quickly found
that African entrepreneurs stepped forward to act as middlemen in the industry, saving
valuable time and effort (Manning 1990). Illiterate natives of West Africa instantly
adopted capitalism when offered it (Bauer 1954).

The African slavers may have

deposited more prosperity in westem African ports than any industry since.
People with no “capitalistic” traditions are known to become capitalists very
quickly when the benefits o f free markets are weighed against their costs. “There is no
better way of thoroughly refuting Polanyi’s weeping about the lost glories o f “society,”
wrote Rothbard (2004, 5) than to observe the numberless millions who have chosen the
way o f the market when they had free choice” (Rothbard 2004, 5). “[P]copies all over
the world, regardless o f cultural tradition, abandon their supposedly beloved culture, in
order to adopt Westem ways, Westem clothes, get a Westem-type job or serve Westem
tourists, and eam Westem money— and drink Coca-Cola and go to Hollywood movies,
as well. It took only a few years, for example, for the people o f Japan to abandon their
thousand-year old traditional culture and folkways to tum eagerly to these supposedly
decadent market-brought goods o f the West” (Rothbard 2004, 5).
When the intemational fur trade exploded in the eighteenth century. Native
Americans quickly became the major producers in what was one o f the world’s most
lucrative industries. Indian production o f beaver pelts and deerskins “generated the
fourth highest export eamings in the British North American colonies on the eve o f the
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American Revolution” (Murphy 1999,152). Indians also worked for pay as guides,
rowers, and frontier laborers in the American backcountry (152). As Carlos and Lewis
(1999)*recount, Native Americans were central players in these industries rather than
passive agents in white men’s trade.
Indeed, human progression from hunting and gathering to agriculture can be
interpreted as a “capitalistic” endeavor. The evidence clearly establishes that farming
produces more calories than hunting and gathering for each unit o f labor invested,
measured in time or energy (Sillitoe 2002, 454), and individuals who opt to make the
switch are maximizing profits o f energy and resources. This progression was likely
produced by the urge to optimize the acquisition o f resources and capital (Sillitoe 2002,
456).

Summarizing World Economic History
Heilbroner (1975, 53) points out that the famous trade explorers o f the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries (e.g., Columbus, Vasco de Gama, Cabral and Magellan) were
“state adventurers,” commissioned and supplied by kings and queens as their agents.
Where traders acted privately on their own behalf, they often navigated a treacherous
landscape o f taxation and predatory regulation by governmental authorities. “Over a
journey o f a hundred miles, a traveling merchant might fall under a dozen different
sovereignties, each with different rules, regulations, laws, weights, measures, money.
Worse yet, at each border there was apt to be a toll station” (Heilbroner 1975, 52).
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Authoritarian economic organization The Great Wall o f China constructed in
medieval China, the great public works o f ancient Rome, the Great Pyramid o f Cheops
were all built by command economies (Heilbroner
Summing up the vast literature o f human economic history and development is
fraught with difficulties. One must conclude, however, that the claims o f Weber, Marx,
and Durkheim that profit-driven trade is a new, westem phenomenon has been
undermined substantially by the research o f the past half-century. At the very least,
“capitalism” as defined by both Marx and Weber is much older than the theorists
assumed it to be.
At the same time, it must be conceded that capitalism has grown both in the
scope, scale, and speed o f transactions, and the dependability and predictability o f
banking, credit, and purchasing systems. It seems safe to conclude that “capitalism”—
the free exchange o f goods and survives according to private, individual, choice— is
expanding in most o f the world (Kessler 1973). Free labor “has become the norm in
much o f the world today” (Sowell 2004, 32).
It seems appropriate to concede that the alienation-model theorists were at least
correct with regard to their overall assessment that human economic exchange has
generally increased over the centuries. The evidence seems clear that markets that were
once controlled by state authorities or closed to private enterprise have opened up; that
cross-global trade has increased in real terms over time, and that private firms
independent o f state-directed execution have circulated more goods, produced more
products and exchanged more private wealth as human history has unfolded.
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Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) documented an observable trend in the average
world trade globalization (measured by world imports versus global GDP) from 1830 to
1990. Although global trade over these generations exhibited many cyclical peaks and
valleys, peaks generally rose higher than earlier peaks with each cycle. Similarly,
Timothy Earle’s prodigious Bronze Age Economics (2002) reconstructs a general trend
from chiefdoms to centrally-controlled agrarian civilizations to industrialized market
economies. A “long-term trend o f intensification” may be the most descriptive
conception o f this progression (Earle 2002, 322).
Payne’s analysis o f taxation trends supports the view that free markets have
gradually benefited from lower taxes over the centuries. Rates o f taxation were
extremely high in some comers o f the ancient world, inhibiting commerce and causing
violent revolts that contributed to the deaths o f the Egyptian and Roman empires (Payne
2004, 200-212). In contrast, rates o f taxation have generally declined in most nations
over the past fifty years.
This conceptual view o f capitalism as a growing trend is substantiated, at least in
recent decades, by figures from Freedom House, which has ranked countries according
to levels o f capitalism since 1972. Freedom House’s first tabulation in 1972 counted 42
countries— some 30 percent o f the world’s nations— as “free.” By 2001, 57 countries,
or 41 percent of the world’s nations, were rated free (Freedom House 2002).
The Freedom House index, established in 1972, evaluates countries according to
a checklist o f questions regarding political rights and civil liberties as outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nations are ranked on a scale o f 1 to 7, with
seven representing the lowest level o f freedom and one representing the highest.
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Averages on scales o f political rights and civil liberties are combined to determine
whether countries are designated Free, Partly Free, or Not Free (Karatnycky 2003).
Since the first annual publication o f the Freedom House ratings, the scores have
tended to show significant gains for freedom around the world. Advances for freedom
have outpaced reversals by a margin o f three to one. “This means that over the last
thirty years, the number of Free countries has more than doubled; the number o f Partly
Free states has grown by 17; while the number o f the most repressive Not Free states
has declined by 21. This represents a landmark change in the political landscape o f the
world” (Karatnycky 2003, 4).
Another index of capitalism, the Economic Freedom o f the World (EFW) index
kept by the Canadian Fraser Institute, originated in a series o f conferences put together
by Michael Walker and several Nobel Prize winners including Milton Friedman, Gary
Becker, and Douglas North. The index is currently available for 123 countries,
measures five key ingredients o f economic freedom, including size o f government (as
measured by expenditures, taxes, and enterprises), legal structure and the protection of
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade outside national borders, and
degree o f credit, labor, and business regulation. A number o f other components and
sub-components are also factored into each country’s index score, so that 38 distinct
pieces o f data The EFW index is generally thought to be superior to the Freedom
House rankings because it relies on more points o f data and is maintained with greater
deference to third-party evaluations. However, the EFW is not a perfect measure o f
capitalism.
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CHAPTER 5

MEASURING CAPITALISM
For more recent years (i.e., since the 1980s), there are published index scores
measuring levels o f capitalism in various nations, as published by economic think tanks
such as The Fraser Institute, Freedom House, and the Heritage Foundation. Social
violence will be generally measured by homicide rates, for reasons o f expediency and
necessity. 1 will explain this reliance on homicide data in my methods chapter(s).
The Economic Freedom o f the World report published by Canada’s Fraser
Institute ranks nations according to criteria measuring the degree to which a nation’s
institutions and policies promote voluntary exchange, protection o f property rights,
open markets, and minimal regulation o f economic activity. . The Fraser Institute’s
indexes were designed by Nobel-Prize winning economists like Milton Friedman. The
first Economic Freedom o f the World Report was published in 1996 after a decade o f
research by more than 100 scholars from various fields. The Fraser index uses 38
variables for each country where available. The top quintile of economically free
countries have an average score o f 9 or 10 on the United Nation’s Human Development
index, whereas the bottom quintile least economically free countries have an average
score of 6 or less. Hong Kong garnered the highest economic freedom rating, followed
by Singapore, the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
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The data gathered by Miles, Feulner Jr., and O ’Grady (2004) also show a
discernable worldwide trend toward increasing economic liberalization. Their annual
report. The Index of Economic Freedom, published jointly by the Wall Street Journal
and the Heritage Foundation, employs 10 factors to measure economic freedom around
the world. The Index of Economic Freedom (hereafter, the WSJ Index), also scores
Hong Kong as having “the world’s freest economy” (xi). Also like the EFW index, the
WSJ index has Europe claiming the largest number o f countries in the top 10.
The WSJ index measures how well 161 countries score on a list o f 50
independent variables, with low scores being more desirable. “The higher the score on
a factor, the greater the level o f government interference in the economy and the less
economic freedom a country enjoys” (p.l). Hong Kong and Singapore lead the world
according to the index because o f their good investment climate characterized hy strong
property rights (p. 2). Europe claims six o f the 10 freest countries. The authors note
that European countries have recently reduced their fiscal burdens by privatizing
industries, lowering taxes and tariffs, and contracting out for government services.
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CHAPTER 6

MEASURING VIOLENCE WORLDWIDE
Measuring capitalism may be the easy part. Measuring the second component
o f the alienation model, violence, turns out to be at least equally difficult. Attempting
to measure and compare violence across world jurisdictions over time poses “a veritable
methodological quicksand” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 10) due to varying standards of
violence and criminality around the world. World jurisdictions vary tremendously in
the ways they define, record, and act upon different behaviors of the same crime lahel
(Archer and Gartner 1984). Different societies employ different indicators o f basic
crime categories. Some countries measure homicide by offenses known, some by
arrests, some by court cases, some by convictions, and some by incarcerations (Archer
and Gartner 1984).
International institutions that systematically collect a wide variety and depth of
data about the world’s nations do not systematically collect even the most basic crime
data in a standardized form. It appears that the United Nations (UN) may have
attempted to collect such data at different times, hut that its member nations have
objected or sought to suppress the publication o f this data (Archer and Gartner 1984,
20). Political sensitivity may explain this recalcitrance (Archer and Gartner 1984, 21).
Interpol collects annual submissions o f crime data by member nations, but its
records are often discontinuous and inconsistent in their standards (Archer and Gartner
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1984, 18). “The murder category excludes ‘accidental manslaughter’ in 1953, but by
1969 it excludes all ‘manslaughter’” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 18). Even where
“homicide” data are reported, they often represent varying measurements.
During the 1970s, sociologists Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner (1984)
undertook an ambitious study to obtain crime reports from 110 nations covering the
years 1900 to 1970. They established a data set entitled the Comparative Crime Data
File (CCDF) which was published in the mid 1980s. The CCDF data set is
discontinuous and widely varying. Nations vary in the ways they define and record
behaviors. Homicide can include (1) first and second-degree murder, (2) manslaughter,
meaning “unintentional” or negligent homicide.

The Peculiar Case O f The United States
The inquiry into a capitalism-homicide relationship suffers from the
overrepresentation o f data and insights from the United States. “An undesirably large
part o f existing research on crime and violence is grounded in [this] single case”
(Archer and Gartner 1984, 5). This emphasis on the United States for data on crime and
violence has major implications to the overall trajectory of research into alienation, and
to this study. Western scholars have suffered from “America bias”— a tendency to view
homicide and economic relationships within the United States as unrealistically
representative o f world trends. The basis for this bias is the lack o f systematic research
on homicide in other nations (Archer and Gartner 1984).
And the United States represents an extreme outlier: it is both extremely high on
every index o f economic freedom but also produces relatively high rates of homicide.
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American social scientists who have suggested the existence o f a capitalism-violence
relationship have had only to point to their own country for anecdotal evidence
supporting the existence of a relationship. Yet without a rigorous cross-national
comparison, the generality o f this proposition cannot be ascertained (Archer and
Gartner 1984).

The Failure O f Previous Methods
The failure o f social science to accurately account for violence in nowestem
societies has only come to light during the last two decades. This failure is most
profound with regard to simple, so-called Third-World societies. Ethnographic
researchers from the field o f anthropology have skewed the picture o f violence among
simple societies for generations. Ever since the days o f Marx and Weber, many social
scientists have internalized the vision of primitive man as a “noble savage.” As
Edgerton (1992) writes, anthropologists in the field who carry such “Rousseauist
illusions” tend to dismiss evidence o f disharmony, jealousy, and violence as the
products o f contact with “colonial officials, soldiers, missionaries, or traders” (8).
Anthropologist Robert B. Edgerton concluded that “it is likely that the
ethnographic record substantially underreports the amount and kind o f human suffering
and discontent that has actually existed in the world’s small societies” (5). Many
ethnographies are “idealized, even romanticized portraits.” For example, Jane Belo
described the Balinese as a society in which babies did not cry, small boys did not fight,
and everyone behaved politely and respectfully—claims discredited hy descriptions in
the same text if not by other sources (5). Robert Redfield described the Mexican village
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o f Tepoztlaiî as tranquil and content, but his own student Oscar Lewis described the
same society as filled with malice, distrust, hatred, and fear (5-6).
Elizabeth Marshall Thomas’s book The Harmless People, about the Kalahari
Bushmen was later exposed as providing a one-sided, overly sympathetic image of
Kalahari life: later research revealed the Kalahari to produce very high homicide rates
(6). Colin M. Trunbull’s The Forest People, “probably the most widely read
ethnography ever written” (Edgerton 1992, 6), described Zaire’s Mhuti tribesmen as a
society without homicide, suicide or rape, and without war. This ethnography, in print
continuously since 1961 and still prescribed reading in anthropology classes worldwide,
depicts a “prototype o f a folk society” (Edgerton 6). Just as with other primitive
ethnographies o f the mid-twentieth century, however. The Forest People proved to be a
romanticized yam with regard to its depictions o f tribal harmony (Edgerton 1992, 6).
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CHAPTER 7

VIOLENCE IN DECLINE
Calculating historical national homicide rates without standardized reporting
criteria within each U.S. state may ultimately be an act o f speculation. Even today,
regional norms of violence are so diverse that it might be more accurate to speak o f
America’s homicide rates in the plural sense. Louisiana, for example, had a 1997
homicide rate o f 15.7 per hundred thousand population while South Dakota had a rate
11 times lower, only 1.4 per hundred thousand. From such a diversity, it seems almost
misleading to say that the United States has a unified homicide rate today.
The same is even more true for generations past. While seventeenth-century
Virginia was a violent and disorderly place, the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not;
although the South and the western frontier experienced very high levels o f violence,
rural New England and Mormon Utah were recognized for their social tranquility
(Courtwright 1998, 3). Computing a national homicide rate for a given historical
period, therefore, seems unduly difficult. We have rough figures for only a sparse
cross-section of locales for the nineteenth century, and eighteenth-century homicides
are even harder to count.
Scholars of violence disagree, however, over whether interpersonal violence has
increased or declined over time. Rates o f violent crime in the United States have been
recorded with something approaching systematic order only since the 1950s (Lane
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1997). Social scientists and historians can be said to be in disagreement over the nature,
prevalence, and scope of social violence prior to the twentieth century. Stacks of
scholarly books obtainable from any large library promote rival positions {compare
Chasinl995; Montagu 1968 with Payne 2004; Kealey 1998). Articles in the most
prominent sociology and criminology journals come to competing conclusions.
The question o f how rates o f interpersonal violence have changed over history
has heen frequently revisited by sociologists and historians (Brearly, 1931; Chesnais,
1992; Lane, 1997). In 1969, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, under the auspices o f presidential authority, compiled studies hy a number o f
historians and scholars on trends in American violence (Graham and Gurr, 1969). The
background for the study was the urhan and campus rioting of the 1960s, and
policymakers expected clear evidence o f historic upward trends in violence. The
historians came to no compelling consensus, however. A general conclusion was that
American rates o f violence have always been substantially higher than those o f other
western societies, and that overall violence had actually declined slowly as the United
States matured.
A more recent treatise by Roger Lane (1997) concluded that the America o f the
1990s was probably less violent than the America o f the year 1900, which was in turn
probably less violent than the America o f 1800. Lane found that American rates of
violent killings fell by about a third in cities like Philadelphia between the early
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (p. 185), a phenomenon attributable to the
work habits engendered by the industrial revolution and an increasingly sober and
educated population (p. 183-185).
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Reports of violence and crime have taken up an increasing proportion o f
American news coverage during the past two decades (Glassner, 1999). But as Ted
Chicicos (1998) and others have shown, fear of crime has no relationship to the
incidence o f crime. In fact, news media coverage o f crime has generated a spiraling
effect among media consumers. Fear o f crime and violence has been found to be more
closely related to modem news exposure than to real experiences.'^ Those who express
the highest levels o f fear o f violence have rarely suffered from such violence.'^ The
public’s perception o f an increase in violent crime in spite o f the declining crime rates
during the 1990s (Shichor 2000, 8).
This erroneous picture o f chaos and disorder painted by social commentators
brought about radical changes in American society throughout the 1980s and ‘90s. Zero
tolerance policies in schools and playgrounds and mandatory arrest laws have been
enacted by policymakers to quell the alleged crisis o f violence facing American society.
Average criminal sentences for violent crimes more than doubled between the 1970s
and 2000.
Growth in American regulatory culture has also had an impact on rates of
violence. The United States was founded in an era when professional police forces
were unheard of, and law enforcement was the duty o f the common citizen (Roots,
2001). “With every passing decade,” however, “the police advantage grew” (Lane,
1997, p. 182). By the late nineteenth century, police held such firm control over private
violence that it had become almost unthinkable for individuals to prevail against them
(Lane, 1997, p. 182-183). As America’s history has progressed, its laws have been
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more stringently enforced by police, its prosecutors have let fewer suspects go, and its
juries have been increasingly likely to convict (Lane, 1997, p. 194-195).
Under zero tolerance policies, students who commit even minor acts o f violence
or possess any type o f weapon are excluded from institutions. Toy guns, butter knives
to cut bread, nail files, swiss army knife key chains, shooting paper clips with rubber
bands, or vaving two spent firecrackers in a pocket have all resulted in suspension or
expulsion. Bringing the medication Midol to school to alleviate menstrual cramps,
sharing lemon cough drops, tasting Alka-Seltzer, possessing Tylenol have also led to
suspensions for “drug-related” infractions. A student who wrote an essay for
Halloween with violent overtures was not only expelled but jailed in Texas. In
Sayreville, New Jersey, four kindergartners suspected o f pointing their fingers at other
students and pretending to shoot them were reprimanded. A 15-year-old Chicago
student who brought an elaborately carved cane to show-and-tell was expelled for
bringing a weapon to school. A 15-year-old Tulsa, Oklahoma girl was suspended for
putting a hex on a teacher.
The irony is that Zero Tolerance, a product o f the most peaceful period in
American history. Chicago expulsions jumped from 21 in 1994-95 to 668 in 1997-98,
an increase o f 3,000 percent. In Massachusetts, there were 90 expulsions in 1992-93,
but now expels approximately 1500 students each year. Chicago actually had to
establish a special school for expelled students in 1998. There has also been a major
shifts toward use o f psychiatric drugs. Millions o f children are already on Ritalin, and
hundereds o f thousands are under other medications. Prozac, ironically, this forced
medicating, creates “potted plant syndrome” according to Professor Ferris.
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Driven by rising public fear o f violence, public health officials declared violence
to be a national public health threat during the 1980s and 1990s (Gilligan, 1996;
Moynihan, 1993).'* In 1983, a ‘Violence Epidemiology Branch’ was created at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). During 1999, the Branch was
involved in research activities such as the reduction o f injuries from firearms, school
violence prevention, and reduction o f suicide (Potter & Saltzman, 2000, p. 1, 4). The
June 10, 1992 issue o f the Journal o f the American Medical Association was devoted
entirely to the subject o f violence and included an editorial cosigned by United States
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop entitled “Violence in America: A Public Health
Emergency” (Moynihan, p. 1993).
Even when empirical evidence indicates violent crime is on the decline,
politicians and public officials often paint violence as a growing threat. U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno told one audience during the mid-1990s that “no comer o f America
is safe fi-om increasing levels o f criminal violence.” “Parents are afraid to let their
children walk to school alone. Children hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds.
The elderly lock themselves in their homes, and innocent Americans of all ages find
their lives changed by the fear o f crime” (Greenhaum, 1997, 136). Former President
Richard Nixon, in his 1994 book Beyond Peace, grieved that liberal judges and lawyers
had brought on a “fearful increase in violent crime” (Nixon, 1994, p. 231).
“Having reviewed the sociology of violence, we believe we have made a strong
case that our society has become organized around unresolved, multigenerational
traumatic experience” (Bloom and Reichert 1998, 99). The pervasive violence inherent
in American society creates a “robopathology” a state o f deep and pervasive alienation
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in which values are “grounded in material possessions, rather than in feelings, social
welfare, mercy, love, or peace” (Bloom and Reichert 1998, 93).
It is noteworthy that the American Sociological Association has also endorsed
the view that violence has become so prevalent that only a public health mobilization
can deal with it effectively. “Beyond the criminal justice and mental health systems,
public health institutions most directly deal with violence on a day-to-day basis. The
enormous burden placed on emergency room and rehabilitation facilities from gun
injuries alone has made violence a major public health problem and a crucial arena for
further study” (Levine and Rosich 1996, 64).

Reconstructing Violence Rates From Anecdotal Evidence
For the most part, trends in violence prior to 1900 must be reconstructed from
anecdotal evidence. The violence historian becomes an estimator rather than a
measurer. However, recordings o f assessments and reflections regarding violence are
by no means difficult to find. Commentators from Tocqueville to Dickens published
their observations of the prevalence o f violence around them and many literate
laypersons likewise noted their perceptions o f the violence around them in diaries and
journals.
And the picture painted by writers of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries
depict a social landscape ridden with excessive violence. For much o f American
history, violence has been a part o f everyday life. Both parents and teachers used
corporal punishment routinely until quite recently (Siegel 1995, 2126). Even soldiers,
prisoners, and sailors were routinely disciplined with whips and clubs throughout most
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o f American history (Siegel, 1995,2125-26 n.26-27). Misdemeanor offenses in the
nineteenth century had to be dealt with by the private citizen on his own terms. “The
farther hack the [crime rate] figures go,” according to Lane (1968), “the higher is the
relative proportion o f serious crimes” (Lane, 1968, p. 452). Many common acts of
criminal violence in such times were never reported to the agents o f the law, as “those
affected either shrugged off their injuries or struck back directly” (Lane 1968, 450).
British forensic psychiatrist John Gunn (1973) pointed to interviews o f older police
officers who said that a considerable amount o f violent behavior was taken for granted
and not reported and recorded in earlier times, as it would be today. Saturday night
brawls and knife fights, once overlooked in crime statistics, became more uniformly
recorded as the twentieth century wore on (Gunn, 1973, p. 130).
Anecdotes from Europe establish similar horrors from previous centuries.
French historians have observed that personal brutality and crimes o f violence
were strikingly common in medieval times. . . . In Russia, historian Alex de
Jonge notes that “Seventeenth-century Moscow was an extraordinarily violent
city. Robbery and murder were commonplace, and every morning there would
be a fresh hatch o f corpses to be found and laid out in the streets.” He quotes a
contemporary source who reported that “No night passes without a murder” and
that the number o f murders could reach as high as 15 in one night (Payne 2004,
185).
British emissary William Crawford, who undertook a systematic study of
American criminal justice in the 1830s, concluded that many brutal slayings went
totally unnoticed “in a legal sense” (Crawford, 1834, 26).
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Crimes are of course matters o f frequent occurrence, and y e t . . . the
discrepancies between the number o f commitments and the actual
extent of crime, in the more western as well as the southern States,
merit peculiar attention. There exists in those parts of the country a
great recklessness o f human life. Personal insult is resented by the
immediate gratification o f revenge. A custom prevails o f carrying
pocket pistols, or o f wearing a dirk in the bosom, while scarcely any of
the labouring classes are without a large clasped knife, which, opening
with a spring, becomes a truly formidable weapon. Hence assaults of
the most desperate character in the public streets frequently occur, and
death to the parties often ensues. Prosecutions, however, arising out of
these acts o f violence, are by no means common (Crawford, 26).

Murder Rates In American History
The murder rates of contemporary American cities pale in comparison to those
experienced in transient communities o f the western United States during the gold rush.
The small mining town of Bodie, Colorado, for example, experienced 29 killings
between 1877 and 1883, giving it a statistical homicide rate almost four times higher
than modem crime capitols like Atlanta and Miami at the peak o f their homicide rates in
the late 1980s. (White 1991, 331). Larger cities, especially those with substantial
migrant populations, also had higher crime rates than we know today, although exact
figures are in many cases difficult to obtain. San Francisco, for example, experienced
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more murders in one year in the late 1880s with a population of around 30,000 to
35,000 people, than in the late 1980s with a population o f 700,000 (Miller, 1994, p. 12).
The Los Angeles riots received tremendous exposure in 1992, but they pale in
comparison to the draft riots in new York City in the mid 1800s (id.).
Since national crime statistics are dependent upon local data, regional
differences in categorizing and crime recording make generalized interpretations
difficult. Alterations in the tabulation o f New York crime statistics, for instance, led to
a 72 percent increase in 1966 in the official records (Guis 96). Another prominent crime
researcher complained as recently as 1996 that “[hjomicide is the only crime [the
official FBI Crime Report] measures accurately enough to make cross-jurisdictional
comparisons” (Neuman & Wiegand, 2000, 132).

Homicide as a Measure of Overall Violence
Due to these problems with measuring (or even precisely defining) “violence”
on a general basis, violence scholars have often used homicide rates as rough substitute
measures of over-all social violence (Caplow, Hicks, and Wattenherg 2001, 214).'^
Most students o f violence are familiar with graphs charting homicide rates in the U.S.
from 1900 to 2000. These graphs show that homicide rates peaked at highs o f greater
than nine per hundred thousand persons on and off during the 1980s and early 1990s
and also during the early 1930s. Although rates o f homicide have subsequently
declined to around 5.8, they are still higher than rates from earlier in the twentieth
century.
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Murder, unlike other categories o f violence, is “relatively immune” to
underreporting (Archer and Gartner 1984, 35). Within western nations, there are strong
reasons to believe that homicide is fully counted in national crime statistics. A
presidential crime commission concluded that homicide is “an especially valid indicator
because it appeared to be invulnerable to police misclassification” (Archer and Gartner
1984, 35 (citing Mulvihill and Tumin 1969)). Homicide also appears to be “relatively
invariant in definition and tabulation” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 35). The combination
o f these factors make homicide data a valid basis for comparative research on hoth
trends and levels o f violent crime (Archer and Gartner 1984).

Homicide Rates Before 1900
Expanding the graph to apply to earlier generations is exceedingly difficult. The
twentieth century was “the first measured century,” and previous generations had no
traditions o f counting and measuring social conditions (Caplow, Hicks, & Wattenherg,
2001). Crime itself is a phenomenon whose records were not systematically kept until
at least the second quarter o f the twentieth century (Lane, 1997: 307).^° “Before 1900,
there are no national figures at all,” and the regional records that are available are a
“potpourri o f arrests, indictments, imprisonments, and executions, with a few runs o f
coroners’ reports . . . not easily comparable to each other [across jurisdictions, and]
rarely span many years or decades in any given township, county, city, or state” (Lane,
1997: 309). “Above all they undercount, to some unknown degree, the number of
killings actually committed” (309).
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Infanticide
Accounts o f crimes against children in the distant past make today’s child abuse
rates seem incredibly mild in comparison. Most societies at one time systematically
killed a substantial proportion o f female infants—sometimes by selective neglect, but
often by smothering or abandonment. This form o f murder, known as infanticide, was
prevalent in Europe until fairly recently. In 1835, the French government recorded the
abandonment o f more than 150,000 infants. In Britain it was not uncommon in the
eighteenth century to find the corpses o f bahies lying on dungheeps or in the streets.
(Stark, 340). Nor were Americans immune from the tendency to murder or abandon
infants rather than care for them:

Through the 1850s no record was kept o f “dead infants found” in
vacant lots, privies, and gutters, but at times during the following
decade the reported annual total for Philadelphia reached about one
every other day. In addition to these, thousands were reported each
year as stillhom, or having died either o f suffocation or o f a number of
other causes impossible for the medical science o f the day to
distinguish from strangulation . . . (Lane, 1997, 119).

Conflicting Assessments O f Violence Authorities
Nothing demonstrates the difficulty o f assessing rates o f homicide from
historical anecdotes like the disagreements o f noted scholars. The great criminologist
Cesare Lomhroso, writing before the turn o f the twentieth century, found the United
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States between the 1860s and the 1890s to exhibit a level of lawlessness that had “no
equal in the rest o f the world.” Lomhroso’s statistics purported to show that crime rates
rose 445 percent while the U.S. population rose 170 percent during the period (Bettman,
1974, p. 87). Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, editors o f American Violence: A
Documentary History, regard the Reconstruction era as “the bloodiest period of
American civil violence, as whites acted to reverse their military defeat” (1970, 223).
But according to Roger Lane, one o f the foremost authorities on the history of
American murder rates, the antebellum years o f 1830 to the 1840s were “the most
disorderly and hloodiest in our history” (Lane, 1997, 92):

European travelers to Georgia or Tennessee brought hack gory
accounts o f the number o f men whose ears or noses had heen bitten off,
or eyes gouged out, in tavern brawls. These fights, if conducted
“fairly,” were considered a form o f purely private recreation, carried on
without official interference from the few extant officials o f law
enforcement. In Richmond, during its frontier stage, there were no
prosecutions for assault; it was not done to call the sheriff (Lane, 1997,
86).

The disagreements between scholars regarding the prevalence o f violence in the past
shows that reconstructing homicide rates from anecdotal writings is accomplished only
with great speculation.
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James L. Payne (2004,184) cites a study o f 13"’-century European court records
that suggest an average homicide rates around 19 deaths per 100,000 population per
year. “Because this 13''’-century figure is based on court trials, not reported homicides,
it almost certainly understates the homicide rate o f the time” (p. 184). Payne also
identifies a homicide rate of 110 per 100,000 in Oxford in the 1340s, a rate
approximately 100 times the modem rate in England (2004, 184). Rome and other
Italian cities had a homicide rate o f about 180 per 100,000 in the eighteenth century
(Payne 2004,184). This rate is more than thirty times greater than contemporary
American rates.

When the trends for all the studies are combined, they show that the
homicide rate declined from about 20 in the 1200s to about 10 in the
1500s, and then to 1-2 in the modem period, that is, since 1860. From
the evidence, it is clear, as historian Michael MacDonald puts it, that
“seventeenth-century villages bore no relation to the peaceable
kingdoms anxious urbanites imagine made up ‘the world we have lost;’
hatred, fear and violence were endemic in mral England before the
Industrial Revolution” (Payne 2004, 184).

Going back further, violence becomes only one o f multiple strands of constant human
miseries that humanity had to contend with. As Payne (2002) writes, for “some forty
centuries o f history spanning tens o f thousands o f tribes, kingdoms, and empires around
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the world, virtually all o f the information about violence over all this time and in all
these places has been lost or was never recorded (448):

What little we know about the past reveals that it was appallingly bloody.
Start, if you like, with the Bihle, which reports in the book o f Joshua that
the Hebrew conquest of the Holy Land was a systematic program o f Godordained genocide, an extermination o f every man, woman, and child in
each conquered city. Turn your attention to China, and you will find a
history of stupendous civil wars, each costing millions o f lives, as one can
estimate from the abrupt declines in population following the upheavals.
For example, as a result o f the fighting and massacres o f the Nanking revolt
in 1853-64, the population o f the province fell by 70 percent (Payne 2002,
449).

Violence In Early Myth And Texts
If m an’s earliest writings are replete with references to trade and commerce,
they abound with accounts o f violence. The Palette o f Narmer, from Hierakonpolis,
Upper Egypt— sometimes described as “the first page of the first chapter of the written
history o f Egypt”— depicts a powerful king smiting a kneeling victim with a blow to the
head (Rudgley 1999). Every known society’s founding myths emphasize violent death,
violent war, and violent conflict.
Most readers o f the Bible are struck by the ubiquity and savagery o f violence
recorded in it. A number of facts become clear to any reader o f The Bible: both the
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ubiquity o f commerce and the ubiquity o f violence in the world o f its authors. From
Genesis to Revelations, The Bible provides a history o f middle-eastern warfare in the
theatre o f commercial trade.
Ultimately, we are left with little more than archeological evidence, for indicia
o f homicide rates in human antiquity. Even the fossil record reveals scrapes, scalpings
that can only be attributed to aggression by one person against another.

Domestic Violence
Claims that violence is on the increase are often made within the context o f
domestic violence. Family violence scholars like Felder and Victor (1996) have
referred to “the increasingly widespread problem o f domestic violence” (p. 39). “There
is a war heing waged on women in America,” according to Felder and Victor (1996).
Despite such proclamations, studies o f family violence indicate that the actual
incidence o f such violence has declined markedly over three decades. Historically,
minor violence in the home was so universal that it rarely captured the public’s
attention. Minor spousal beating was considered a prerogative o f spouses under
American law until the mid-1800s (Siegel, 1996, p. 2125). Later, the law changed to
deny husbands the privilege o f beating their wives, hut granted them immunity from
prosecution for wife-beating under marital privacy rationales (Siegel, p. 2120). Only in
the 1970s and ‘80s did spousal violence come to be a real concern o f the criminal
justice system.
Evidence indicates that the increased prevalence o f domestic violence and child
abuse among violent crime statistics is almost certainly an example o f better crime
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reporting rather than real changes in crime (Gelles & Strauss, 1988). Before the 1970s,
signs o f hattery on small children were rarely reported, whereas increased public
recognition o f domestic violence has made the reported figures leap up. (Gunn, 139).
The probable reality is that violence by intimates has declined markedly in a quartercentury. In 1996, intimates committed 36 percent fewer murders than in 1976 (Bureau
o f Justice Statistics, 1998). Spouse murder, the largest component o f intimate murder,
declined by 52 percent in the same period {id.). Gelles and Straus (1988) documented a
substantial drop in projected domestic violence between 1975 and 1986. They
attributed this drop not to new formal (criminal justice) constraints but to lower social
tolerance for wife batterers.
It is also known that accounts o f crimes against children in the distant past make
today’s child abuse rates seem incredibly mild in comparison. Most societies at one
time systematically killed a substantial proportion of female infants—sometimes by
selective neglect, but often by smothering or abandonment. This infanticide was
prevalent in Europe until fairly recently. In 1835, the French government recorded the
abandonment o f more than 150,000 infants. In Britain it was not uncommon in the
eighteenth century to find the corpses o f babies lying on dungheeps or in the streets.
(Stark, 340).
The reality is that men have approved o f wife beating in virtually every pre
industrial society (Edgerton 1992, 81). In many such societies, choice, desirable foods
were denied to women simply because men reserved them for themselves. In his
review o f food tahoos, Frederick Simoons reported that after women among the
Chukchee o f Siberia had done all the work o f slaughtering, butchering , and cooking
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reindeer, Chukchee men ate their fill, leaving only scraps and bones for the women.
These men left no doubt about how they felt when they said, “Being women, eat
crumhs.” The Chukchee were hardly unique. Peter Freuchen observed that for the
Hudson Bay Inuit, hoiled meat was “m an’s food, too good for women to have.”
Similarly, in many parts of aboriginal Australia, women were not allowed access to
food that men were especially fond o f : instead, the men ate alone, then “threw” what
they could not eat to the women (Edgerton 1992, 81-82).^'
Thus, the observations o f other types o f violence seem applicable to domestic
violence. As American sensitivity to domestic violence has grown, so have popular
restatements of its severity increased, and so has its actual incidence declined.
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CHAPTER 8

OVERALL TRENDS IN AMERICAN VIOLENCE
Crime statistics demonstrate that contemporary life in the United States is now
less violent than ever measured before. Violent crime in general plummeted 27 percent
between 1993 and 1998. Nonfatal violent crime has never been so low since the Justice
Department began tracking the data in 1973 (Grier, 1999, p. 4). Homicide rates in the
American workplace are possibly at an all-time low, with a decline o f 46 percent of
robbery-related homicides registered between 1994 and 1998 (Providence Journal, Aug.
5, 1999). The homicide rate has recently declined to a mere 6.3 per 100,000, lower than
at any time since the late 1960s (Bureau o f Justice Statistics, 2000).
Indeed, America has become so safe from violence that the risk of accidental
death has increased substantially in comparison. 31 percent more Americans died from
falling in 1999 than in 1992 (Wald, 2000). Accidental poisonings increased by 48
percent in the same period. Also during the same period, 29 percent few er Americans
died from firearms accidents in 1999 than a decade earlier. Much o f this growth in
accidental death rates is attributed to an increase in numbers o f elderly people prone to
falls and drug overdoses (Wald, 2000).
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Payne’s History O f Force
James L. Payne’s A History o f Force (2004) suggested that the underlying
course o f human history was away from violence and toward more peaceful resolutions
of social conflict. “As far as we can tell from the historical record, we live in a much
more peaceful world than has ever existed,” Payne wrote (p. 7). Claims to the contrary,
he asserted, were attributable to a trio o f culprits: “the fallacy o f presentism” (the wellreeognized tendency to believe that our own time is special or important), the bias of
interest groups (including politicians and police officials) with stakes in the promotion
o f the alienation thesis, and sampling bias by the media (p. 8).
The fallacy of presentism appears to distort the judgment o f every observer.
Edward Gibbon, author o f the Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire, remarked that
people universally tend to “exalt the past and depreciate the present” (Kilpatrick 2003).
Even learned historians make the mistake o f assuming “that events of the present are
larger, more important, or more shocking than events o f the past” (Payne 2004, 8).
Irving Louis Horowitz described it as “an assumption that the period they are living
through is somehow more fragile than any other, filled with tragedies not before felt,
and accomplishments not before realized” (Horowitz 1977, 115).
Nearly every human generation has believed itself enveloped in a mushrooming
surge o f violence and crime. The majority o f Englishmen in the nineteenth century,
according to British criminologist J.S. Cockbum, “were convinced that crime was
increasing as never before.” “[T]he authors of the eighteenth century, likewise, were
terrified at what they considered to be the advent o f a wave o f violent crime.” (Chesnais
1992,233X
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This current-time-and-place bias has followed American pop-criminology into
its present era (e.g., Bloom and Reichert 1998; Pro throw-Stith 1991). Even during the
mid-1990s, when empirical evidence indicated violent crime was on the decline,
politicians and public officials painted violence as a growing threat. “[N]o comer o f
America is safe from increasing levels o f criminal violence,” said Attorney General
Janet Reno during a speech in the mid-1990s. “Parents are afraid to let their children
walk to school alone. Children hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds. The
elderly lock themselves in their homes, and innocent Americans o f all ages find their
lives changed by the fear o f crime” (Greenbaum, 1997, 136). Richard Nixon, in his
final book, lamented that liberal judges o f the 1960s and ‘70s had brought about a
“fearful increase in violent crime” in the 1990s (Nixon, 1994, p. 231). Even academics
have fallen for this temptation to paint violence as “increasingly widespread” (Felder
and Victor 1996, 39).

The Decline O f War
But what about wars and other forms o f collective violence? Again, the
evidence indicates that military conflicts around the world are claiming fewer and fewer
lives. Payne (2004, 15) notes that the rate o f killing in wars is now less than l/lOO'*’ the
pace o f a century ago. The deadliest known war in North American history on a per
capita basis was King Philips War in 1675-76, when approximately one-fourth o f all
participants lost their lives. The French and Indian War, the Revolutionary War, and
the Civil War also produced extremely high proportionate casualty counts. But not
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since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has there been a military exchange o f any
scope in North America.

The Difficulty O f Compiling Historical Crime Figures
Official crime figures from America’s past tell very little of the whole story of
American crime. Since national crime statistics are dependent upon regional data,
differences in categorizing and crime recording make generalized interpretations
difficult. Alterations in the tabulation o f New York crime statistics, for instance, led to
a 72 percent increase in 1966 in the official state records. (Guis, 96). Even at the turn o f
the twenty-first century, “[hjomicide is the only crime [the official FBI Crime Reports]
measures accurately enough to make cross-jurisdictional comparisons (Neuman &
Wiegand, 2000,132)."
In general, formal criminal justice institutions o f past generations dealt only with
the most severe crimes. Criminal justice in the nineteenth century concentrated on the
more important prisonable offenses, “to the neglect o f others, even indictable ones’’
(Lane, 1968). Many common acts o f criminal violence in such times were never
reported to the agents of the law, as “those affected either shrugged off their injuries or
struck back directly’’ (id., 450).
Misdemeanor offenses in the nineteenth century had to be dealt with by the
private citizen on the private citizen’s own terms. “The farther back the [crime rate]
figures go," according to historian Roger Lane, “the higher is the relative proportion of
serious crimes” (Lane, 1968, 452). In other words, before the advent o f professional
police, fewer crimes— only the most serious crimes—were brought to the attention o f the
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courts. Professional police have thus helped spread the onus o f criminality over larger
masses o f the population.
British forensic psychiatrist John Gunn (1973) argues that the prevalence of
crime dropped substantially in both Britain and the United States over the course o f the
twentieth century. Any increase in the official figures reflects only a decreased
tolerance o f crime, according to Gunn. Gunn points to interviews o f older police
officers who said that a considerable amount o f violent behavior was taken for granted
in the past and not reported and recorded, as it would be today. Saturday night brawls
and knife fights, once overlooked in crime statistics, now are more uniformly recorded.
(Gunn, 130).
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CHAPTER 9

AMERICAN VIOLENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
American society is not only much safer now than in the past, it is also much
safer than many societies of the present. In such places as Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador
(all scoring quite low on indexes o f capitalism), murder is the prime eause o f death
among young male adults. Among the native populations o f Venezuela, nearly half of
all males over 25 have participated in a killing. Data from central African countries is
difficult to come by but probably demonstrates similar rates (Chesnais, 219). Private
firearm ownership is extremely rare in eaeh o f these societies.
Modem commentators often decry the too-frequent use by juveniles o f firearms
to resolve conflicts. “Disputes that would previously have ended in fist fights,”
aeeording to Stuart Greenbaum (1997), “are now more likely to lead to shootings.”
Yet this argument loses support when considered in historical context. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dueling with pistols was considered a standard rite
o f passage for young men in both America and Europe. Between 1819 and 1826, more
than 800 young men were killed in duels in the French army alone in a seven year
period. The vast majority of such duels were over petty grievances and trivial rivalries
(Chesnais, 224).
In antebellum Virginia, violence between students was so common that students
routinely went armed to defend themselves from attack. “Challenges are continually
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passing; fights are had almost every day,” wrote one student to his parents. Another
student assured his faculty that the bowie knife he carried was intended only for use
“against a person who should insult him and refuse to give him honorable satisfaction”
Ayers, 1991, 103-04).
The modem reality is that youth homicide rates have declined by 30 percent in
recent years and more than three times as many people die from being stmek by
lightning than by violence at schools (Glassner, 1999, xv). Schools are generally safer
at school among other students than outside o f school.

Firearm Violence
Much o f the scholarship about violence involves firearms and the impact of
firearms on American life. The United States does indeed have rates o f firearm deaths
higher than many industrialized nations. However, the rate o f actual exposure to
firearm violence may be somewhat exaggerated. Firearm deaths declined nine percent
between 1990 and 1996 (USA Today, 1999, Al).
More than half o f all firearm deaths every year are suicides, which are
preventable by the victim. The 13,000 or so annual firearm homicides in the United
States represents less than half o f the number o f Americans who die annually from
occupational hazards and disease (Reiman, 1999, 80) and less than even the number o f
Americans who die prematurely from medical malpractice (id.). Firearm homicides
also pale in comparison to the 400,000 Americans who die from tobacco (id., 84) and
the 50,000 Americans who die from traffic accidents every year.
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Even the modem shibboleth o f the “drive-by shooting” is nothing new. Such
acts were quite common in America during prohibition and even led Congress to place
regulations on machine guns in the 1930s. Just as the much less capable semi
automatic “assault weapons” have been targeted for regulation as “the gun o f choice for
drug dealers and street gangs.” (Ferris, 162).
Never before have so many armed people lived as safely as now in the United
States. America with its 200 million privately-held firearms is much safer—
exponentially safer—than the England, or the America, o f a century ago. Indeed, guns
may be the safest and most effective means o f protection for hundreds o f thousands, if
not millions, o f Americans each year (Kleck, 1991). While the specific numbers of
defensive uses of firearms may be in dispute (Duncan, 2000, 1), few deny that hundreds
of thousands o f Americans use personal firearms to protect lives and property each year
(Waters, 1998).
Violent crime in general plummeted 27 percent between 1993 and 1998.
Nonfatal violent crime has never been so low since the Justice Department began
tracking the data in 1973 (Grier, 1999, 4). Homicide rates in the American workplace
are possibly at an all-time low, with a decline o f 46 percent o f robbery-related
homicides registered between 1994 and 1998 (Providence Journal, Aug. 5, 1999). The
homicide rate has recently declined to a mere 6.3 per 100,000, lower than at any time
since the late 1960s (Bureau o f Justice Statistics, 2000).
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Accidental Violence
America has become so safe from violence that accidental deaths have increased
substantially in comparison. 31 percent more Americans died from falling in 1999 than
in 1992 (Wald, 2000). Poisonings increased by 48 percent in the same period (id.). In
the same period, 29 percent few er Americans died from firearms accidents (id.). Much
of this growth in accidental death rates is attributed to an increase in numbers o f elderly
people prone to falls and drug overdoses (id.).
Interpersonal violence has probably never been so rare in the United States as at
the dawn o f the twenty-first century. Violence in American schools, in American
homes, and in the American workplace is at or near an all-time low. Although
homicide rates remain higher in the United States than in other industrialized nations,
homicide trends appear to be declining sharply from a decade ago.
Popular proclamations and images indicate that violence in America in the year
2000 is exceedingly prevalent. Violence in schools, violence in the workplace, and
violence on the roads have taken up an increased proportion o f American news
coverage (Glassner, 1999). Violent crime in modem America is often presented by the
news media with emotion-laden language (Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997).
Headlines in major news magazines include “Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets,”
“Danger in the Safety Zone,” “In a State o f Terror,” “Taming the Killers,” and “Florida:
State o f Rage” (id., p. 342). Three Florida State University professors have described a
“burst o f media coverage” in which television and newspaper stories about violent
crime increased more than 400 percent during four months in 1993 (id.).
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Nor has the popular press had a monopoly on the characterization of American
violence as epidemic. Attorney General Janet Reno recently told an audience that “no
comer o f America is safe from increasing levels o f criminal violence” Greenbaum,
1997, 136). “Parents are afraid to let their children walk to school alone. Children
hesitate to play in neighborhood playgrounds. The elderly lock themselves in their
homes, and innocent Americans o f all ages find their lives changed by the fear o f
crime” (id.).
Margaret Mead sparked a romance among westem anthropologists for the noble
simplicity and passivity o f primitive people. Throughout the 1950s to the 1970s,
anthropologists traversed islands in the South Pacific, joumeyed to remote regions o f
Africa, and explored the interior of South America in search o f hunter-gatherer
societies, producing studies with titles like The Harmless People (Thomas 1959), Never
in Anger (Briggs 1970), and A Nonviolent People o f Malaya (Dentan 1979). E. Richard
Sorenson’s descriptions of the Fore people o f Papua New Guinea (1977) likewise
described an affectionate, tmsting society in which “sibling rivalry was virtually
undetectable” until exposure to trade goods, jobs and money brought “[ejpisodes of
infant and child frustration, not seen in traditional Fore hamlets [along with] repeated
incidents o f anger, withdrawal, aggressiveness and stinginess.” In the 1980s, however,
this picture of pre-agrarian man was shattered by the research o f anthropologists like
Richard B. Lee, Bmce M. Knauft, Napoleon Chagnon, and Robert Edgerton and
sociobiologists like Kanrad Lorenz who found that many o f these simple societies
actually produced homicide rates substantially higher than those found in the West.
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Knauft (1987) found that the otherwise polite and amicable Gebusi people o f
New Guinea had a homicide rate o f approximately 683 per 100,000 prior to contact
with the West in the 1960s. The Yanomamo tribes o f central Venezuela murdered each
other at a rate o f 165.9 people per hundred thousand annually in the 1970s. Even the
egalitarian, noncompetitive people of Samoa, o f which Margaret Mead wrote so fondly,
generated homicide rates more than twice as high as those found in the United States
(Knauft 1987, Table 2).

□ Q jin n D

Figure 1 Homicide Rates (per 100,000 Population) o f Selected Societies

The immense discrepancy between the ethnographic observations of
anthropologists like Mead, Thomas, and Dentan and the quantitative calculations
offered by Knauft, Lee, and others may do more than call into question the
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methodology o f qualitative research. They may actually mean that rates of homicide
among simple societies are not accurate measures o f overall social violence. If so, this
discrepancy virtually undermines the notion that homicide rates are a rough overall
measure o f social violence.
Knauft himself (1987) suggested that this discrepancy may be for the most part
isolated among primitive peoples. “Especially in egalitarian societies, there may be a
pattern o f social life that is generally peaceful and tranquil but is punctuated by
aggression which, when it does occur, is unrestrained [which] may result in a high ratio
o f lethal violence to aggression despite a low overall incidence o f aggression” (459).
But observations o f peace and tranquility accompanied by known high incidences o f
lethal homicide are by no means confined to simple societies. Loutenant Colonel
George Armstrong Custer noted in his accounts that his heavily armed cavalrymen were
often polite and courteous with one another, even though their sidearms. U. S. Supreme
Court Justice Stephen J. Field, who carried a pistol and bowie knife at all times while
living among the California gold rush, commented that “1 found that a knowledge that
they were worn generally created a wholesome courtesy of manner and language”
(Swisher 1963, 66). also commented Historical accounts form westem commentators
also suggest that homicide may not be an accurate measure o f overall violence.
Table 1 illustrates the high level o f consistency o f national homicide rates over
time. Although homicide rates fluctuate greatly over time in every nation, they tend to
remain consistent across the international panel o f nations when cross-comparasins are
made. Thus, the homicide scores o f Venezuela may differ wildly from year to year, but
remain consistent in relative terms when compared to the other countries on earth.
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Homicide rates recorded for a typical country in 1970 correlate with homicide rates for
the same country in 2000.
Because homicide data is not measured in accordance with strict standards
across the international spectrum, various agencies report different numbers for the
same country in the same year. Some data sets contain only numbers o f prosecuted
murder cases, while others may contain all reports o f homicide to police regardless of
whether prosecutions were commenced. Table 1 also shows significant relationships
between these different homicide measurements.
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Table 1. Correlations between international homicide rates, 1970-2000
(significance)

1993/1
996

homici
de
rates
1975
combin
ed
homici
de rate
1975
homici
de rate
1994
homici
de
rates
2000
homici
de
rates
1970
homici
de/
murder
rates
1975
homici
de/mur
der
rates

1970
horn
rates

1975
comb.
horn
rates

1975 hom/
murder
rates

1975 hom
rates

1993/1996
hom rate

.908**
(.000)**

.359**
(.010)**

.676**
(.000)**

.335*
(.021)*

2**

2**

(.000)**

1994
hom
rates

.961**
(.000)**

2000
hom
rates

.905**
(.000)**

.887**
(.000)**

.399**
(.005)**

(.000)**

.523**
(.002)**

.969**
(.000)**

.359**
(.010)**

.439**
(.007)**

.969**
(.000)**

.559*
(.013)*

2**

.335*
(.021)*

(000)**

.608**
(.001)**

.967**
(.000)**

.653**
(.001)**

2**
.935**
(.000)**

.887**
(.000)**

.968**
(.000)**

.967**
(.000)**

.961**
(.000)**

.650**
(.000)**

.608**
(.001)**

.771**
(.002)**

.653**
(.001)**

.905**
(.000)**

(.000)**

.898**
(.000)**

.399**
(.005)**

.523**
(.002)**

.898**
(.000)**

2**
(.000)**

.439**
(.007)**

.559*
(.013)*

.908**
(.000)**

.676**
(.000)**

(.000)**

.992**
(.000)**

.992**
(.000)**

2**
(.000)**

.935**
(.000)**

.968**
(.000)**

.650**
(.000)**

.771**
(.002)**

** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2- tailed)
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
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CHAPTER 10

CORRELATIONS
Are high index scores o f market freedom correlated with high homicide rates?
Figure 2 shows the correlation coefficients obtained when homicide data is analyzed
against the market-freedom indexes o f three different economic research institutions.
Significant correlations were found between Fraser Institute capitalism rankings from
1970 and homicide rates in 1975. No such correlation was found, however, between the
same index scores and either the homicide/murder rate figures for 1970 or 1975.
What is most distressing from the viewpoint o f the alienation thesis is the total
absence o f support for the notion that greater capitalism equals higher homicide rates.
Indeed, the only significant correlations identified in Table 2 below are negative
correlations. A significant negative correlation was identified between the Fraser scores
for 1975 and worldwide homicide rates for the same year. This seems to suggest not
only that the alleged relationship between increasing capitalism and increasing violence
is untenable or without support, but that it is actually false.
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Table 2. Correlations between economic freedom and homicide rates

Fraser
rankings
1970
Fraser
ranking
1975
Fraser
index
1975
Fraser
index
1990
Fraser
index
1995
Heritage
index
1995
Freedom
House
index
1995
Heritage
index
2004

Hom/
murder
rates
1970
-.174
(.253)

Horn/
murder
rates
1975
-.259
(.285)

Hom rates
1975

-.149
(.267)

-.165
(.464)

-.381*
(.014)*

-.132
(.424)

-.074
(.778)

-.375*
(.014)*

Hom
rates
1994

Hom
rates
1993/
1996

Hom
rates
2000

-.358
(.190)

-.270*
(.031)*

-.137
(.463)

-.446
(.095)

-.257*
(.029)*

-.393*
(.031)*

.248
(.413)

.112
(.422)

.244
(.261)

-.290
(.276)

-.190
(.192)

-.138
(.458)

-.064
(.807)

.136
(.254)

.146
(.394)

-.374*
(.029)*

* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

What about relationships between noneconomic social variables like fertility rates, birth
rates and population density? No significant correlations were found between any of
these variables and homicide rates.
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Table 3 Correlations Between Homicide Rates and 3 Social Indicators

Hom rates 1994
Birthrates 2000
Population density
2000
Fertility rates 2000

Hom rates
1993/96^^
.188
(.117)
-.118
(.358)
.089
(.460)

-.131
(.616)
-.131
(.616)
.299
(.260)

Hom rates 2000^^*
-.299
(.097)
-.207
(.263)
.028
(.883)

Obvious questions arise regarding the consistency o f economic freedom
measurements by these different economic think tanks. Correlation analysis was run
with capitalism scores of all three indexes as well as scores registered by the three
indexes for different years. There is remarkable consistency between these indexes
across time. Table 4 lays out the extent o f the correlations between the three indexes of
capitalism. Not only do the rival indexes track each other significantly for the same
years, but they correlate significantly with each other in all years for which data was
analyzed.
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Table 4. Correlations Between Rival Indexes O f Capitalism
Fraser
Fraser
Fraser
Heritage Freedom
rankings index
index
index
House
1970
1975
1990
1995
1995

Fraser
index
1995

Fraser
rankings
1970

] **
(.000)**

.802**
(.000)**

.772**
(.000)**

-.703**
(.000)**

.545**
(.000)**

.542**
(.000)**

Fraser
rankings
1975

.873**
(.000)**

.963**
(.000)**

.718**
(.000)**

-.557**
(.000)**

.491**
(.000)**

.572**
(.000)**

Fraser
index
1975

.802**
(.000)**

1**

(.000)**

.742**
(.000)**

-.640**
(.000)**

.384**
(.021)*

.560**
(.000)**

Fraser
index
1990

.772**
(.000)**

.742**
(.000)**

2* *
(.000)**

-.734**
(.000)**

.677**
(.000)**

.854**
(.000)**

Heritage
1995
index

-.703**
(.000)**

-.640**
(.000)**

-.734**
(.000)**

2* *

(.000)**

-.810**
(.000)**

-.784**
(.000)**

Freedom
House
1995

.545**
(.000)**

.384**
(.021)**

.677**
(.000)**

-.810**
(.000)**

2**
(.000)**

.635**
(.000)**

Fraser
Index
1995

.542**
(.000)**

.560**
(.000)**

.854**
(.000)**

-.784**
(.000)**

.635**
(.000)**

2**
(.000)**

Herit
age
index
2004

.639*
*
(.000

.557*
*
(.000

.489*
*
(.000

.695*
*
(.000
.831*
*
(.000

.853*
*
(.000

.683*
*

(.000
Heritage -.639**
-.489** -.695**
.831**
-.853**
index
(.000)** (.000)** (.000)** (.000)** (.000)**
2004
(significance)
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

-.683**
(.000)**
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1**
(.000

Regression Analysis
To determine whether eeonomie freedom is a predictor o f homicide rates,
regression analysis was run with 1975 homieide rates as the dependent variable and the
Fraser rankings for 1970 and 1975 as the independent variables. To further test the
strength (if any) o f the relationship, the raw index scores of the Fraser indexes for 1975
were also analyzed in regression. Again, a predietive relationship resulted, in the
opposite direetion from the trajectory predicted by the alienation models.

Table 5 Regression, with 1975 homieide rates as the dependent variable.
(standard error) [significance]
Mean 1975
homicide rates
Fraser
-4.369** (.971)
[.002]
rankings
1970
Fraser
9.985** (2.061)
rankings
[.001]
1975
Fraser index
-7.189**
1975
(1.964) [.006]
Fraser Index
-3.441*
of 48 nations (1.345)
(1975)
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table 6 shows the results o f similar regression analysis when homieide rates for
the year 2000 are the dependent variable and 2000 fertility rates, 2000 population
density scores, and the 1995 index scores reported by the Heritage Index, the Freedom
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House Index, and the Fraser Index. The Heritage (WSJ) and Fraser scores were found
to be significant predictors o f homicide rates in the year 2000. Interestingly, neither
fertility rates nor population density figures were significant predictors.

Table 6 Regression: Pep Variable: Hom Rates 2000 (standard error) [significance]
Significance
Fertility
.463 (3.239)
.889
rate 2000
Population
-.014 (.008)
.120
density
2000
Heritage
-4.044* (2.049)
.074*
index
seores 1995
Freedom
.091 (.474)
.851
House
scores 1995
Fraser
-2.130* (.965)
.049*
index
scores 1995
* = Regression relationship is significant at the 0.05 evel
Sources: fertility and population data: The Statesman’s Yearbook 2000 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press)

Similar findings are achieved when eonducting regression analysis on 1995
Fraser Index scores and homicide rates registered in 1993 and 1996. There is a
significant negative relationship between the two variables: as levels of market freedom
go up, homicide rates tend to come down. By inferenee, increasing capitalism is
significantly linked to greater safety from social violence (espeeially homicide). Table
7 displays these findings.
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Table 7 Regression With Mid-1990s Homicide Rates
As the Dependent Variable
B (standard error)
Fraser Index
-2.887* (1.296)
of 73
countries
(1995)
(standard error)
* = Regression relationship is significant at the 0.05 level

Significanee
.029*

Although this relationship is significant, it by no means translates into a
smoothness of predictability regarding any individual eountry. Figure 3 below
illustrates the haphazardness o f this capitalism/homicide relationship during the mid1990s. While some eapitalist eountries like Hong Kong and the Netherlands have very
low homicide rates, others, like the United States and some of the newly independent
nations that once made up the Soviet Union, are quite violent.
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Figure 3 Eeonomie Freedom and Homieide Rates, Mid-1990s.

S

2

□ Econom ic Freedom Index S core (1995)
m Annual Homicides P er 100,000 (1993)

Findings
The findings from these analyses provide no support for the proposition that
greater capitalism is equated with growing violenee. In eontrast, there is support for the
proposition that greater capitalism is linked to decreasing social violence, as measured
by rates o f homicide. Societies with high indexes o f economic freedom also tend to
report homieide rates below the international mean.
“What is curious, however, is that this concern with violent individuals has all
too often eelipsed the study of violent authorities” (Archer and Gartner 1984, 64).
Social violence, after all, must include violence by state agents against individuals. And
a test o f the alienation proposition—the idea that increasing capitalism increases social
violence— must take violent repression by governments into eonsideration. Here the
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alienation proposition runs up against immediate obstacles. The quest to eliminate and
repress capitalism has cost more than one hundred million lives since the turn o f the
twentieth century (Rummel 2003).
Oficourse, “[sjerious violence, including homicide, is produced routinely in the
eourse o f law enforcement, eriminal punishment and executions, crowd and riot control,
political subversion and assassination and, o f eourse, war” (Archer and Gartner 1984,
63).

The Apparent Trend o f Underreporting By Socialist Nations
The quality o f homicide comparisons across nations is undermined by varying
rates of underreporting by nations. National governments probably never overreport the
prevalence o f homicide within their jurisdictions, but often publish reports that
understate homicide rates when international studies or record-keeping organizations
seek data from them. It might even be said that each nation has its own underreporting
rate. One technique for determining the rate o f underreporting involves the comparison
of surveys o f crime victims with official crime reports (Archer and Gartner 1984).
It can safely be said, however, that “the degree of undemumeration varies
inversely with the seriousness o f the offense,” and homicide is underreported at rates
much lower than other violent offenses. It needs also to be said that socialist nations
have apparently exhibited a greater proclivity to underreport or decline to report their
homicide data. Archer and Gartner 1984, 17) note that socialist countries represented
“exceptions to [the] general pattern of remarkable cooperation” in their study o f cross
national violence from 1970 to 1984. The U.S.S.R. and several other Eastern European
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societies refused to participate in the study and the People’s Republic of China returned
all requests for erime data unopened (p. 17).

Apparent Trend o f Accelerating Effect
The trend against violence appears to accelerate in capitalist countries (Payne
2004, 121). Violent practices went for thousands o f years without mueh change. “Most
o f the progress [against violence] seems to have come in the past two or three
centuries— that is, since the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions” (Payne 2004, 121).
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CHAPTER 11

HOMICIDE PERCENTAGES IN THE DISTANT PAST
Archaeological revelations have also shattered the illusion o f most Marxists that
egalitarian simple societies were typified by peaceful coexistence, placid, and tranquil.
The native American societies o f the U. S. Southwest, the Anasazi, once thought— and
described in textbooks, musems and National Park Service documents as peaceful and
nonwarlike— have now been revealed as a violent people whose walled residences were
designed for combat defense— and who participated in bloody massacres of one another
long before the arrival of westem capitalism (LeBlanc 2003).
Indeed, this Rousseaun bias has for too long infected archeology itself.
“Virtually all the basic textbooks on archaeology ignore the prevalence or significanee
o f past warfare, which is usually not discussed until the formation o f state-level
civilizations such as ancient Sumer” (LeBlane 2003, 20). Keeley, the author o f War
Before Civilization (1996), argued that prehistorians “pacified the past,” presuming
peacefulness even where evidence o f warmaking could not be ignored (LeBlanc 2003,
21 ).

But the closer one looks at the record, the more violent it becomes. Prehistoric
bone armor found in the Arctic; skeletal evidence o f deadly blows to the head among
ancient Aborigines. LeBlanc (2003, 22) contends that the prehistoric Indians o f
southern California— once though to be peaceful acorn gatherers— exhibited the highest
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incident o f warfare deaths ever known in world history or prehistory. Thirty percent o f
males of first century A.D. had wounds or did violent deaths. For women, the rates
were about half this. “When we remember that not all warfare deaths leave skeletal
evidence, this is a staggering number” (22).
All well-studied prehistoric farming societies had warfare (LeBlanc 2003, 23).
Ancient China, Micronesia, etc. were all well-fortified. Defensive walls hundreds of
miles long were shared by Maya, Inco, Sumerian, and Hawaiin culture (LeBlanc 2003,
23). “As soon as societies can write, they write about warfare” (LeBlanc 2003, 23).
LeBlanc (2003) describes the proposition that white Westerners spread warfare
to peaceful people as “a patently false but prevalent notion” (LeBlanc 2003, 23).
LeBlanc calculated the proportion o f foraging and farming societies that died from
warfare and violence and found “that foragers and farmers have much higher death
rates— often approaching 25 percent o f the men— than more recent complex societies”
(LeBlanc 2003, 25). Thus, modem capitalistic environs like the contemporary United
States are much safer than pre-industrial societies. LeBlanc (2003, 25) credits the
Industrial revolution for bringing homicide rates down, as have others (Lane 1997).
“In a nutshell,” writes Steven Pinker (2002, 56) “Hobbes was right, Rousseau was
wrong.”

To begin with, the stories o f tribes out there somewhere who have
never heard o f violence turn out to be urban legends. Margaret Mead’s
descriptions o f peace-loving New Guineans and sexually nonchalant
Samoans were based on perfunctory research and turned out to be
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almost perversely wrong. As the anthropologist Derek Freeman later
documented, Samoans may beat or kill their daughters if they are not
virgins on their wedding night, a young man who cannot woo a virgin
may rape one to extort her into eloping, and the family o f a cuckolded
husband may attack and kill the adulterer. The !Kung San o f the
Kalahari Desert had been described by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas as
“the harmless people” in a book with that title. But as soon as
anthropologists camped out long enough to accumulate data, they
discovered that the !Kung San have a murder rate higher than that o f
American inner cities. They learned as well that a group o f the San had
recently avenged a murder by sneaking into the killer’s group and
executing every man, woman, and child as they slept (Pinker 2002, 56).

Counting societies instead o f bodies leads to equally grim figures.
In 1978 the anthropologist Carol Ember calculated that 90 percent o f
hunter-gatherer societies are known to engage in warfare, and 64
percent wage war at least once every two years. Even the 90 percent
figure may be an underestimate, because anthropologists often cannot
study a tribe long enough to measure outbreaks that occur every decade
or so (Pinker 2002, 57).
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One method o f reconstructing the homicide rates of the anciest past involves
looking at the archeological record. Human remains sometimes exhibit signs o f violent
death such as broken bones, lacerations, or even imbedded arrowheads. By simply
counting human specimens that appear to have died violently and comparing their
numbers to remains dating to the same period, we can draw crude estimates o f the
prevalence o f violence in a particular period.
Archeology-based methods pose special risks for researchers. It is not always
easy to tell whether a mummified or preserved corpse died by violence. For this reason,
homicide rate estimates from archeological sources underestimate homicide prevalences
to some unknown, but probably substantial, extent.
Moreover, the haphazard placement o f archeological finds makes estimates of
broader prevalences difficult. A site with five murdered corpses found at an ancient
American quarry, for example, may say very little about the overall homicide rate o f
North America, or even the plains. Thus, even if such homicides show high rates in a
given year or decade, their relevance to the homicide rates o f an entire century or
millennia is questionable.
The standard measure o f the prevelance o f homicide is murders per 100,000
members o f a population per year. Computing the statistic requires three separate
measurements: time period, homicide deaths, and total population. The farther we look
into the past, the more difficult it is to determine each o f these components. Even if the
population o f a specific city or region during a certain period is known, surrounding
populations may be quite difficult to determine. In the case o f some locales, historic
population estimates may differ within a range o f several multiples. Scholars o f North
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American Indian populations before the arrival o f Columbus, for example, have offered
estimates ranging from 1.8 million to 18 million (Mann 2002, 46). Thus, even if the
number o f homicides among this population were known, estimates o f the homicide rate
might vary by a factor o f ten.
The dimension o f time adds further complexity. Because o f the difficulty o f
dating archaeological finds with exact precision, we can only attribute a given find to a
range o f years. This problem grows as we look farther back in time. Estimating
historical homicide rates in this manner is also haphazard because what we know of
archaeological remains are rarely found through systematic archeological searches.
Instead, most archaeological discovery comes to us accidentally or through salvage
excavations (Bahn 1996, 11). For this reason, archaeological samples may not be
representative o f the place or period in question.
At most, we can say only that a known rate o f uncovered remains with signs of
having died violently has been identified out of a total number o f known uncovered
remains within a given area dating to a particular range of years. This method of
determining homicide prevelences is as simple as stumbling across a cemetery filled
with human corpses and estimating how many died by violence. An overall period o f
interment in the cemetery might establish the temporal element. We might be able to
say, for example, that a burial ground dating to the 200-year period from 1750 to 1950
exhibited a crude rate o f 1.5 percent violent deaths.
A rival and far less precise method for determining the historic prevalence of
homicide is to simply find textual summaries o f archaeological findings and conduct
content analysis o f them, counting up deaths described as attributable to homicide and
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dividing this tally by the total number o f deaths reported in the same source(s).
Estimating historical homicide rates in this manner is also haphazard because what we
know o f archaeological remains are rarely found through systematic archeological
searches. Instead, most archaeological discovery comes to us accidentally or through
salvage excavations (Bahn 1996, 11). For this reason, archaeological samples may not
be representative o f the place or period in question.
Applying this method to one general treatise on archaeological finds yields
results that are quite surprising. Paul Bahn’s Tombs, Graves & Mummies (1996)
provides case studies o f “fifty o f the world’s best documented sites o f bodies and
graves” (Bahn 1996, inside front cover). This compendium o f 50 discoveries in world
archeology, from Lucy, the 3-million-year-old australopithecine found in Ethiopia to
Zhoukoudian and Java Man, to the killings of Custer and his cavalry at Little Big Horn
in 1876. Bahn’s sample of fifty sites was selected in accordance to no sampling
rationale except to show “the incredible variety o f human remains that survive the
archeological record (11). Bahn notes that a “surprisingly large number of bodies that
have come down to us with soft tissue intact (p. 10).

Findings
Bahn’s fifty archeaological discoveries yield the remains of something like
18,670 human beings. O f this number some 4,983, or 26.7 percent, o f the bodies
exhibit indicia o f violent death, either because they are associated with battlefields, or
because the corpses show signs o f mortal violence, either on the skeleton, on the soft
tissues, or because o f mutilation. When obvious battlefield deaths are removed from
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the total, the proportion who died violently is cut almost in half, to about fourteen
percent o f total deaths. (Of course this figure underestimates the actual percentage o f
deaths in the sample attributable to homicide because many ancient skeletons and
bodies of murdered persons exhibit no outward signs o f violence).
Fortunately, the percentage o f Americans who die by homicide is known. In
1991 any randomly selected American had a one in 151 lifetime chance o f suffering
homicide (National Institute o f Justice 1993).^"^ or 0.66 percent o f all Americans die by
the hands o f others.

Thus, homicide in previous centuries (according to a

nonrepresentative sample o f human remains dating to different continents and
millennia) may have been more than twenty times more prevalent than today.
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CHAPTER 12

THE NOTION THAT CAPITALISM CREATES INEQUALITY
These findings also beg reconsideration o f the oft-repeated catechism that
capitalist economies generate greater gaps between rich and poor than planned
economies. Research by former World Bank economist Suijit S. Bhalla illustrates that
this age-old understanding may be without substantiation. Calculating the world
distribution o f income at twenty-year intervals, Bhalla found that the world’s poor were
getting richer faster than the wealthy during the last half of the twentieth century
(Sanchez 2003). Thus, during a period which almost every scholar describes as one of
growing capitalism worldwide, the world became dramatically more egalitarian.
Naisbitt’s Megatrends (1984) suggested that growing commercialism is
achieving the very purposes o f human equality that its most hostile detractors call for.
Commercialization is breaking up the traditional hierarchies that thrived during the
centralized, pre-industrial eras o f most Western nations. In place o f the old boy
hierarchies o f the past, wrote Naisbitt, contemporary individuals in modernized
societies have substituted “the network model o f organization and communication,”
which is more natural, egalitarian, and spontaneous than the social hierarchies o f the
pre-computer age. Networks formed by like-minded peers restructure the flow of
power and communication from a vertical to a horizontal power structure.
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According to Naisbitt, the “failure o f hierarchies to solve human problems” has
been resolved by expanding access to information. This decentralized flow o f
knowledge has had an equalizing effect (1984, 221). “What occurs in a network is that
members treat one another as peers—because what is important is the information, the
great equalizer” (1984, 220).
Anticapitalists like Naomi Klein paint the contemporary trend as one in which
large dominant corporations like WalMart, Mobile, and Nike are playing an increasing
role. But the data refutes this image resoundingly. Small businesses have exploded in
relation to big business during the past generation (Norberg 2002). The 30 years
between 1950 and 1980 saw the rate o f new businesses explode from 93000 per year to
600,000 per year (Naisbitt 1984, 160). Self-employment has also boomed. Nearly 2/3
of all new jobs created between 1969 and 1976 were in firms o f 20 or less. “During the
1970s, by contrast, the Fortune 1,000 [corporations] produced virtually no job growth”
(Naisbitt 1984, 161). This capitalistic altruism stands in contrast to life among
members o f some primitive societies. “The Siriono Indian o f Bolivia eats alone at night
because, if he eats by day, a crowd gathers around him to stare in envious hatred. The
result among the Siriono is that, in reaction to this pervasive pressure, no one will
voluntarily share food with anybody” (Rothbard 2004b).
Ludwig Von Mises showed that socialists willing to give up significant material
advantages in the name o f their ideals were a minority (Von Mises 1966, 679). The
evidence indicates that aquiring property lifts the human spirit, while failure to acquire
it leaves people depressed. Chronic kleptomaniacs— shoplifters— generally steal to
treat themselves to a cure for anxiety and depression (Hine 2002).
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Moreover, the implications for human happiness overwhelmingly support the
conclusion that alienation is the product o f centralized socialistic redistribution rather
than capitalism. Hocutt (2003) argued that the clear weight o f human experience
establishes that people choose economic systems with recognized property rights over
systems o f centrally-managed property whenever they have the option:

But give people a choice between a country in which they may acquire real
property and one in which they are precluded from doing so, and soon you
will see droves o f unhappy but hopeful souls leaving the latter to join the
former, as the dismal history o f the former Soviet Union and its dreary
satellites confirms. They will be kept in their political prison only with
barbed wire and armed guards (Hocutt 2003, 179).

Moreover, the picture o f social harmony in primitive societies depicted by the
alienation theorists is challenged by contemporary insights into daily life in such
societies. The Inuit, who prize egalitarianism, nonetheless commonly torture animals,
beat their sled dogs, and kill each other at a very high rate (Edgerton 1992, 79-80). The
Mbuti, according to noted anthropologist Colin Turnbull (a firm believer in primitive
peacefulness, incidentally) “kicked [their hunting dogs] mercilessly from the day they
are bom on the day they die” (101). It seems therefore that man is both self-seeking and
altruistic; a natural capitalist and a provider o f charity to those in need. He seeks
personal profits but also shares his surplus with others. In one sense, participating in
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free markets is a kind o f sharing in that it brings one’s energies and resources to
members o f the community but under terms o f personal title and ownership.
In practice, Marxist states have cost the lives o f some 100 million human beings,
many o f whom were murdered. In Marxist Cambodia, the death squads murdered every
literate person. In modem North Korea, some two million persons— approximately ten
percent o f the country’s population— died between 1996 and 2002 o f starvation,
malnutrition and persecution (Kang 2003). Per capita GDP in neighboring South Korea
(which was the other half o f the same country in 1948) was 13 times the level in North
Korea in 2002 (Brooke 2003). Nazi Germany’s pogrom against the Jews -though the
numbers are somewhat disputed— were promulgated to recoup losses perceived to be
attributable to profiteering Jewish speculators who flew into Germany from London,
Paris, and New York to buy German assets for pennies on the dollar (Roots 1997). The
Nuremberg Laws o f 1936 were intended to redistribute this Jewish property back to
Germany.
Writing in 1930, Sigmund Freud predicted this ultimate outcome o f the
communist experiments then taking place around him. “One only wonders,” he
remarked, “what the Soviets will do after they have wiped out their bourgeois” (Freud
1961,73). Although he did not live to see the darkest days o f Soviet terror during the
1950s, his insight into the fundamental paradoxes o f Sovietism proved prescient.
Very few true hunter and gatherer societies exist today. However, the few indepth ethnographies o f hunter-gatherer societies, such as Alin R. Holmberg’s I94I to
1942 study of the Siriono people o f Bolivia. The Sirione were chronically hungry and
seemed to care little about one another’s welfare. Constantly quarreling over food, the
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Siriono often hoarded and hit it, refusing to share it with others and ate alone at night or
in the forest. Women hid food in their vaginas. Sick or elderly persons who could not
keep up with the nomadic movements o f the tribe were abandoned to their deaths.
When offered Western tools or weapons or the opportunity to work as tenant farmers,
they were eager to accept, “even though they were badly mistreated” (Edgerton 1992,
14).
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CHAPTER 13

EXPLANATIONS
If capitalism is linked to decreasing violence instead o f increasing violence, how
then can this be explained? Upon what conceptual basis could a causal relationship be
stated? In this section, a number of hypothetical explanations are employed to answer
these questions.
Tilly (2003) suggests that collective violence follows patterns even in all its
varied forms—barroom brawls, peasant rebellions, labor strikes, ethnic struggles, civil
wars and even international wars. Tilly concludes that democratic political regimes are
the best cure for collective violence because they tend to promote broader participation
and a more extensive array o f rights and institutions that distribute social power across a
greater swath o f the social structure.
Another possible explanation is that Max Weber’s conception of human linearity
(although discredited with regard to his conception o f economic prehistory) accurately
accounts for the diminishing violence experienced in modem capitalist societies.
Weber’s theory o f rationalism assumes that modem social institutions steadily become
more efficient over time as individual agents within the institutions (“bureaucrats”)
develop means to accomplish institutional goals with less and less output of effort and
resources. This rationalism may explain why individuals interacting with each other
within highly developed market-based systems o f exchange employ violence less and
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less over time: interacting nonviolently is simply more efficient (so long as property
claims are recognized by all parties).
In the absence o f clearly defined property and transaction rights, violence serves
as a tool for asserting such rights— and a vehicle for enforcing the social contract
(Jacobs, et al., 2000). One way to visualize this rationalization explanation is to
examine what violence really accomplishes in human interaction. Violence is employed
in some cases where property rights are not clear or where parties perceive a void in
ownership o f property or territory. The use o f violence is the most efficient means to
secure property, territory, or other interests in the absence o f clear property rights.
However, violence is inefficient in many instances, and is certainly a far less certain
tool than legal protections o f property. While it is difficult for some people to view
contemporary western legal systems as efficient, such systems do provide an avenue for
parties to make property claims with certainty and predictability. W eber’s theory o f
rationalization may explain why violence appears to decrease as legal protections for
property and private commercial exchange grow. Looked at in this way, recognition of
property rights offers a substitute for violence.
Batten (1908), wrote that the history o f progress is the gradual diminution o f
waste. “In all the lower stages o f life the amount o f waste is enormous, and
comparatively few living creatures ever reach maturity” (Batten 1908, 233). Thus,
Batten suggested, violent struggle is “Nature’s way o f detecting fitness” in primitive
societies (Batten 1908, 234). M an’s natural progression, accordingly, is toward
gentility and sociability. In advanced societies, “The fittest in Nature are not by any
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means those who are continually at war with others, but those who aid one another” (p.

O f course, violence and war are likely to occur where groups and individuals
perceive a likely benefit (Melotti 1985). In societies where prosperity is offered
through the market, people have fewer incentives to engage in violence to obtain
prosperity. As Von Mises (1966, 821) stated; “The market economy involves peaceful
cooperation. It bursts asunder when the citizens turn into warriors and, instead o f
exchanging commodities and services, fight one another.” Humans with foresight
generally perceive that greater advantages can be derived from cooperation in a market
economy than from conflict. The “essence o f the laissez-faire philosophy,” according
to Von Mises, is cooperation for the purpose o f gaining personal material well-being
(830). “Under laissez faire peaceful coexistence o f a multitude o f sovereign nations is
possible” (824).
Or perhaps the overall material well-being associated with capitalist
economies— and not capitalism itself—is the true cause of decreased violence among
free-market societies. The link between economic capitalism and wealth is
demonstrated by each index. Per capita GDP averages $22,922 (U.S.) among the top
fifth o f nations on the Fraser index, compared to $3,251 (U.S.) among the bottom fifth.
Economic freedom also correlates with economic growth, meaning that citizens o f
capitalistic countries are components o f a growing concern, while citizens o f countries
in the lowest fifth of the Fraser rankings actually witness their nations decline in
economic power. We can only speculate about the impacts o f these trends on the
prevalence o f social violence.
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“O f all the systems o f political economy which have shaped our history, none
has so revolutionized ordinary expectations o f human life— lengthened the life span,
made the elimination o f perty and famine thinkable, enlarged the range o f human
choice— as democratic capitalism” (Novak 1982, 13).“Famine emerges from a lack of
inter-local trade” and only occurs where anti-market regulations have been imposed
(Rothbard 2004). Economists note that countries that share strong trade relations
almost never wage war upon each other (Norberg 2003).
In the wake o f the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the U.S. State Department
established a “State Failure Task Force” to study the geographic, environmental,
economic, and historical factors that contribute to violent political and social turmoil
(Homer-Dixon 298). In essence, the objective was to predict large-scale violence
before it happened. The Task Force examined two million pieces of data and 600
variables. “The results were sadly meager,” according to Thomas Homer-Dixon (299).
“In the end, the findings o f the State Failure Task Force said more about the limits of
contemporary social science, especially political science, than about the reasons states
fail” (299). “Most important, the task force failed, despite the extraordinary skills and
resources at its command, to develop a theoretical or statistical approach that could cope
with the complexity o f human conflict” (300). Only three o f 600 variables—in
combination— were found to predict future levels o f state violence: (1) openness to
international trade, (2) infant mortality, and (3) a nation’s degree o f democracy.
John Naisbitt’s best-selling book Megatrends (1984) suggested that increasing
efficiency and commercialism is creating greater and more diffused opportunity and
choice among consumers. Today’s western societies are “Baskin-Robbins” societies.
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where everything comes in 31 [or many more] flavors. Writing in the early 1980s,
Naisbitt described a U.S. auto market that offered 752 distinct car models to choose
from, and thousands o f choices in light bulbs and cigarettes alone. This “multipleoption society” has “spilled over into other important areas o f our lives: religion, the
arts, music, food, entertainment” (260-61). Increasingly diverse living, lifestyle, and
family arrangements mean that there is no such thing as a conventional family or home
life. “And like Rubik’s cube, the chance o f getting it back to its original state are
practically nil” (Naisbitt 1984, 261). Today, individuals can “shop” for lifestyles,
careers and hobbies like never before, accepting or rejecting traditional family or work
values. “More than ever before people live alone” rather than submit to the desires o f
others (Naisbitt 1984, 261). A multitude o f work options, different shifts, part-time
options and multiple options for working at home or in the field.
The lifestyle empowerment seen in contemporary capitalist societies also
contributes to an increasing political empowerment. Freer economies lead to wealthier
people and wealthier people tend to demand political freedoms. “The political notion of
governance is being completely redefined. Today’s well-informed citizen is capable
and desirous o f participating in political decisions” (Naisbitt 1984, 261).

Limitations
Although the relationship between greater market freedom and lower rates o f
violence appears to be supported by this study, the question of causation leaves the
parameters o f the relationship in some doubt. Generally, researchers can infer the
existence o f a causal relationship when there is a clear relationship between changes in
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two variables, the allegedly causing variable precedes the caused variable, and all other
explanations can be eliminated. In the case o f the relationship between capitalism and
violence, there are many other variables and factors that can possibly explain changes in
both factors.
Payne, however, suggested that declining violence is the cause o f greater
economic freedom and prosperity rather than the effect. “What kind o f economy,” he
asked, “can a community have in the midst o f perpetual civil war?” (2004, 2). “A
reduced use o f force is obviously a necessary condition for prosperity” (p. 2). And to
what does Payne attribute the astounding decline in rates of interpersonal violence over
the centuries? History itself, the steady march o f human progress, or linearity. “One is
almost tempted to answer that ‘History’ is the protagonist in this drama” (p. 27).
There is some evidence that the increasing availability o f low-priced consumer
goods and technology of a widening variety has an equalizing power for the poor and
disadvantaged. A quarter-century ago, Anthony Smith suggested that increasing printmedia options were shifting “sovereignty over text” from authors to receivers (1980).
We now know that Smith drastically understated the egalitarian power o f this trend.
Sovereignty over media sources has rapidly shifted to the individual, and this trend
shows no signs o f abating. In modem commercial societies, members o f society have
more media options than they can possibly partake of. Media consumers now have an
endless supply o f “texts” of their own choices—movies, videos, games, internet
entertainment as well as print media.
One o f the most likely explanations for an inverse relationship between
capitalism and violence involves the pluralistic nature o f sociolegal relations in free-
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market states. The pluralistic model structure orders conduct by restraining individuals
and resolving disputes between competing individuals and groups (Quinney 1978).
Under the pluralistic model, no one group holds power indefinitely. Although western
adversarial legal systems apply a winner-take-all rule, no winner can expect victory in
every case. Elections d iw y up power between rival sectors o f the electorate.
Finally, there is the conclusion that must be faced: that humanity’s natural state
may be a capitalistic one, and that man is most at peace when freed to engage in the
economy without restriction. The evidence supporting this proposition is mounting.
Twenty centuries o f trial and error with other economic systems have failed to produce
adequate results. Lester Thurow, in The Future o f Capitalism (1996) concluded that
“no other economic system other than capitalism has been made to work anywhere” (p.
1). “Capitalism’s nineteenth-and early twentieth-century competitors— fascism,
socialism, and communism— are all gone” (p.l).
Lastly and most importantly, if the alienation proposition, one o f the primary
components in mainstream sociology for more than a century, is without empirical
support, the implications to sociology, economics, and political science are immense.
Certainly, the findings o f this dissertation study cast great doubt on the alienation thesis,
and hint that humanity’s “natural state” may be much closer to what Adam Smith and
Ludwig Von Mises suggested than to a communal or collective state.

130

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CONCLUSION

The findings o f this dissertation study suggest that the thesis that capitalism and
free markets cause tension, disharmony, conflict, and disruption in the social fabric is
largely without support empirically. At least when “capitalism” is operationalized by
means o f published index scores by economic think tanks and “violence” is
operationalized by published homicide rates, there is no provable “alienation” link. On
the contrary, an analysis o f this limited evidence suggests that capitalism may be linked
with decreasing violence. More research is necessary to determine the precise nature of
this relationship, and the years ahead will likely provide further data to assist in this
analysis. However, it can be concluded from this preliminary study that the traditional
Rousseauan “alienation” proposition is without strong support in the economic and
homicide data available at the turn o f the twenty-first century.
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NOTES
' According to Holmstrom and Smith (2000), capitalism is defined as a “unique social
relationship” that depended on “two kinds o f commodity sellers: on the one hand, a
class o f capitalists vested with a virtual monopoly o f the ownership o f the means of
production and, on the other hand, a propertyless proletariat dispossessed o f the means
o f production and subsistence and, consequently, with nothing to sell but their
capacity to labor” (Holmstrom and Smith 2000, 2).

^ Smith’s thesis, often criticized for its simplicity, was that “It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the banker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but
to their self-love, and never take to them o f our own necessities but o f their
advantages” (Smith 1776, 20). Thus, self-interest acts as an invisible hand that guides
products and services to destinations that need them most. “[E]very prudent man in
every period o f society, after the first establishment o f the division o f labour,” wrote
Smith, “must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to
have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce o f his own industry, a certain
quantity of some commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely
to refuse in exchange for the produce o f their industry” (Smith 1991 [1776] 29-30).

^ Sowell provides the example o f Chinese nationals who have left or fled the Chinese
mainland since the beginning o f the twentieth century, often to places like Hong Kong,
Indonesia, and Australia. While an observer o f the Chinese in China during the mid
twentieth century may have drawn the belief that Chinese are culturally not inclined
toward capitalism, an observer o f Chinese people elsewhere in the world would likely
draw the opposite opinion. Sowell points out that “Altogether, ethnic Chinese living
outside China produced as much wealth as China itself in the early 1990s” (1996,
176).

The ethnocentrism with which the founders o f sociology viewed world trade history
can be partially attributed to the dominance o f imperial Europe during the period they
wrote. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim wrote from the comfortable roosts of Western
industrial preeminence in the late nineteenth century. Looking back to the fifteenth to
century, these writers saw that Europeans had visited almost every part o f the world,
meeting people weaker than themselves and ultimately conquering them through the
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promotion o f trade advantages (Parry 1965). “The ‘expansion o f Europe’ was not, of
course, deliberately planned, [but] proved irresistible” (Parry 1965, 7).

^ Interestingly, Freud expressed the view that the alienation theory was “an untenable
illusion” (1961, 71). Abolishing private property, wrote Freud, would not alter the
differences in power and influence that nature has introduced— “injustices against
which there is no remedy” (71 n.7).

^ Heilbroner (1975, 56n.) cites the years 1202 A.D., and 1494 A.D., as two historians’
potential start dates for “capitalism,” referring to the estimations of German economic
historian Werner Sombart and Oswald Spengler, respectively.

’ There is, o f course, some justification for the view that life is speeding up for many
of the world’s citizens. At the dawn o f the nineteenth century, an average person
probably met only a few hundred people in a lifetime (Homer-Dixon 2002: 25).
Almost all information was communicated through speech. Transportation was only
as fast as a horse or a sailing ship could move. Today, a typical man might meet
hundreds o f thousands o f people, reach anywhere on the planet within one day, and
exchange information with other people on the others side of the world instantly by
gigabyte (Homer-Dixon 2002).

^ Notably, Sigmund Freud was a skeptic o f the alienation theory. Freud in his
Civilization and Its Discontents, remarked o f the communist view that
“Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without limit in
primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and it already shows itself in the
nursery almost before property has given up its primal, anal form” (71). “As a rule,”
wrote Freud, man’s “cruel aggressiveness waits for some provocation” to manifest
itself spontaneously and reveal “man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards
his own kind is something alien” (69).

^ Like Marx, Weber’s writings often concentrated on humanity’s economic evolution.
Weber himself wrote a book-length social and economic history o f antiquity entitled
The Agrarian Sociology o f Ancient Civilizations (1909). Weber’s expertise in
economic matters was vast. Weber was, in fact, as much a professor o f Economics as
Sociology, and he taught both subjects over the course o f his career. His record o f
books, essays, and lectures on économie subjects surpasses his “sociological”
publications. A man o f letters, Weber read and spoke several languages including
Latin and Greek. Few scholars living at the time o f his death in 1920 knew more
about pre-historic Eurasian political economy.

Weber cited Beloch, who estimated that the annual trade of Piraeus in 401-400 B.C.
was 2,000 talents (13 million gold franks) based on records o f customs duties.
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“Considering that this was in Piraeus alone, that it was soon after the Pelopennesian
War [and thus in a depressed economy, relatively], that no allowance is made for
changes in the purchasing power o f money, and that even so 2,000 talents is
approximately the equivalent o f one-tenth o f the foreign trade o f the present kingdom
o f Greece [2000 years later], this sum is certainly an impressive figure” (Weber 1983,
34-35).
“Ancient Egypt” cannot be categorized as one scenario, because it thrived for
several millenia. There is one thing certain, however, the business o f Egypt was
business. And business was profitable. “It has been estimated,” wrote Oliver and
Page (1970, 37), “that Egyptian peasants o f the third millennium B.C. may have been
able to produce perhaps three times as much as their own domestic requirements.”
And such great profits inevitably fueled inequality. “A specialist stone-worker might
now spend a whole year grinding out a single vase in polished porphyry to adorn a
rich man’s house or to furnish his tomb” (Oliver and Page 1970, 36).
The Egyptian experiment demonstrated the advancements in survivability that had
been wrought from agriculture and business. One estimate o f the Nile Delta estimated
that the entire valley could only have supported twenty thousand hunter-gatherers; but
in its commercial prime during its ancient dynasties was probably between three and
six million (Oliver and Page 1970, 26).

Coram (1987) tested the proposition that a set o f norms and values, or a “dominant
ideology” is necessary for capitalist societies to exist— a common belief underlying
much social theory (464). He concluded that the proposition is based upon untenable
underlayments and could not survive scrutiny. Capitalism exists even in the absence
o f a state that supports it (Schlosser 2002).

Isaac Asimov, in his Guide to the Bible (1968) plots the “Eden” o f Genesis as the
area o f the Tigress and Euphrates Rivers where ancient civilization arose in the fifth
century B.C. The Bible, according to Asimov, is “a history book covering the first
four thousand years of human civilization” written from the perspective o f the people
o f Canaan, a small section o f Asia bordering the Mediterranean Sea (1968, 9).

Gary North, a Calvinist libertarian who has written approximately 8,000 pages on
the economics o f the Bible, concludes that that “Mosaic economic law as a whole was
pro-market, pro-private ownership, pro-foreign trade, pro-money-lending (Deut.
28:12)” (North 2004). Moreover, writes North, “The New Testament did not break
with most o f these laws, and the few that it did break with, such as slavery and the
jubilee land law, made the resulting position even more market favorable.”

If we look only to the Bible as our source for data regarding ancient Eurasian
civilizations, we must reject the alienation thesis outright. Even if some Biblical
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stories were exaggerated or mythologized, their essence reveals social violence o f an
appalling level (Payne 2004). The Bible describes the ancient near East as a landscape
o f incessant wars, massacres, and homicides. Economically, the region was typified
by private pursuit o f commercial success in the face o f state repression.

Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz (1997) surveyed 2,092 adults in Tallahassee, Florida,
where news coverage o f violent crime has been particularly prominent. They asked
respondents to rate on a scale o f one to ten how much the respondents feared being
robbed by someone with a gun or knife, being burglarized, and being physically
attacked. The study found a substantial relationship between exposure to television
news coverage and fear o f crime. Moreover, the frequency o f watching television
news is “significantly related” to higher fear levels for women, whites and the middleaged.

Research indicates that some substantial portion o f the public’s fear o f violence and
crime can be exclusively attributed to news headlines. Only 22 percent o f people
interviewed by one professor cited personal experience as their basis for their fear o f
crime (Glassner, 1999, xxi). The rest (76 percent) cited stories they had seen in the
media (id.). In the case of drug abuse scares, eight out o f ten adults have never
experienced problems with drug abuse in their family yet nonetheless hold fears about
drug abuse around them (id.). News panics o f a drug abuse epidemic increased by
more than 400 percent during one six-month period in the late 1980s (Chiricos, 1998,

6oy

C. Everett Koop, United States Surgeon General under President Reagan said
“[vjiolence is every bit as much a public health issue for me and my successors in this
century as smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis were for my predecessors in the last
two centuries.” See Introduction to James Gilligan, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic
and Its Causes (1996). The June 10, 1992 issue o f the Journal o f the American
Medical Association was devoted entirely to the subject o f violence and included an
editorial cosigned by Koop entitled “Violence in America: A Public Health
Emergency.” See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, The American
Scholar, Winter 1993.

Not all authorities agree that official murder rates reflect actual rates o f violence,
and indeed, there is support for the idea that early figures did not reflect reality.
Conventional wisdom suggests that murders have always been recorded in some
manner or another. Not so, according to the accounts o f some early American
chronaclers. William Crawford, a British emissary commissioned to undertake a
systematic study o f American criminal justice in the 1830s, concluded that many
brutal slayings went totally unnoticed “in a legal sense” (Crawford, 26):
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Crimes are of course matters o f frequent occurrence, and yet I was informed during
my stay in America that there was not a single prisoner in the [Illinois] penitentiary
convicted of any serious offence. The discrepancies between the number of
commitments and the actual extent o f crime, in the more western as well as the
southern States, merit peculiar attention. There exists in those parts o f the country a
great recklessness o f human life. Personal insult is resented by the immediate
gratification o f revenge. A custom prevails o f carrying pocket pistols, or o f wearing a
dirk in the bosom, while scarcely any o f the labouring classes are without a large
clasped knife, which, opening with a spring, becomes a truly formidable weapon.
Hence assaults of the most desperate character in the public streets frequently occur,
and death to the parties often ensues. Prosecutions, however, arising out o f these acts
of violence, are by no means common (Crawford, 26).

Lane (1997) points out that the earliest national system of quantifying homicides,
based upon the registration o f death certificates, began only in 1906 and that the
system was seriously flawed by regional variations in coroner practices (229). The
earliest attempts at establishing a national homicide rate were made by Professor H.C.
Brearly in the early 1930s.

As Edgerton wrote, these practices do more than simply impose male dominance
and can deprive women o f important proteins and nutrients. In India, West Africa,
Morocco, and South America, women women and their children are more vulnerable
to disease and death form poor nutrition. The Fore o f Paua New Guinea, for example,
are often so deprived o f animal flesh that that women supplement their diets by eating
the flesh o f deceased relatives (p. 82). As a consequence, they contract kuru, a
neurological disease caused often only seen among cannibals (p. 82).
A hybrid data set composed of 1993 United Nations data where available, with
missing data provided by 1996 rates. United Nations, Global Report on Crime and
Justice (1999).

Average homicide rates per years 1998 to 2000 from Barclay and Tavares,
International comparisons o f criminal justice statistics 2000 (2002).

In contrast, the average American in 1991 had a one in 38 chance o f dying by
accident and a one in four chance o f dying from heart disease (National Institute of
Justice 1993).

Note that laws on the books throughout the history o f the United States prohibited
government officials from acting in bad faith when negotiating real estate transactions
with Native Americans. Congress’ Northwest Ordinance of 1787 proclaimed:
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The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property,
rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress, but laws founded injustice and humanity shall from
time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them (Northwest
Ordinance, 1787, Third Article, as found in Prucha 1990).

President Theodore Roosevelt, who had experiences in the frontier West as a young
man, scoffed at claims that the Plains Indians held the lands they roamed upon in the
manner o f owners. Writing in the 1880s:
To recognize the Indian ownership o f the limitless prairies and forests o f this
continent—that is, to consider the dozen squalid savages who hunted at long intervals
over a territory of a thousand square miles as owning it outright, necessarily implies a
similar recognition o f the claims o f every white hunter, squatter, horse thief, or
wandering cattleman. (Jamieson 1996, 32).
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